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Chapter 1 Institutional Support, Constraints, and Unilateral Presidential
Actions
Abstract
What relation, if any, exists between the public and presidential unilat-
eral actions? Though presidents routinely appeal to the public when they
issue executive unilateral actions, we have not yet assessed the relation
between presidential unilateral actions and the public. Using executive
orders data from 1981-2001 and ANES survey data, we hypothesize that
public support for the institution of the presidency represents an impor-
tant constraints on the presidents’ ability to make policies unilaterally.
Results support our expectations. We find that institutional support con-
strains the total number of executive orders issued annually. Further, we
find that institutional support has a varying impact on salient vs. non-
salient unilateral directives. These results have broad implications for the
unilateral presidency literature specifically, as well as broader works in
political science such as the law and public opinion.
1.1 Introduction
“Without a doubt, the most urgent challenge that we face right now is
getting our economy to grow faster and to create more jobs. . . we can’t
wait for an increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where they
won’t act, I will.”
President Barack Obama, October 24, 2011
Increasingly frustrated with a “dysfunctional” Congress, President Obama shifted his
attention toward unilateral actions in order to change government policies. On Jan-
uary 19, 2012, under the defiantly-named “We Can’t Wait” campaign to stimulate the
economy, President Obama signed Executive Order 13597, which calls for increases
in and expedited processing of travel visas to encourage travel to and tourism within
the U.S. borders to spur economic growth while maintaining the stringent security
requirements imposed after 2001. Obama further publicized the event with a public
unveiling at the Disney resort in Orlando, Florida. The publicity associated with
Obama’s executive order raises an interesting question: what relationship, if any,
exists between the public and presidential unilateral actions?
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Many scholars have assessed the circumstances under which presidents will favor
unilateral action (Howell, 2003; Mayer, 2001, 2009; Warber, 2006; Waterman, 2009).
Yet, less clear are the internal and external constraints on presidential unilateral ac-
tions. The internal constraints of presidential unilateral action derive from presidents
themselves, as well as the advice and recommendation of their close advisors. For
example, Fine and Warber (2012) find that Democratic presidents issue more major
policy executive orders, but less symbolic and routine executive orders, compared to
their Republican counterparts. In contrast, external constraints flow from the institu-
tional and the political environments within which presidents operate. For instance,
Congress, the Supreme Court, the media, and the public itself all represent potential
constraints on the extent to which presidents can actually take unilateral actions. In
this paper, we examine one potential source of external constraints: the mass public.
Specifically, we assess how the overall support for the institution of the presidency
constrains a president’s ability to make public policy unilaterally.
While various scholarly works have examined uses of unilateral action, few at-
tempts have been made to link presidential unilateral powers with the mass public.1
The reasons appears to be twofold. First, presidential unilateral actions rarely achieve
the level of salience whereby they are reported by major media outlets. For instance,
Howell (2003) found that the New York Times reported on about 10% of all executive
orders issued annually between 1945-1998. As a result, the majority of the public
typically does not know that presidents making decisions via unilateral directives.
Second, even when the news media does report on the president’s unilateral deci-
sions, the media outlets themselves pay scant attention to the potentially-damaging
consequences of presidential unilateral actions. For instance, though the New York
Times reported that President Obama will issue an executive order in response to
1To our knowledge, there have been no published empirical works thus far that
link presidential unilateral actions and the public. For exception, see Brandon Rot-
tinghaus and Adam Warber’s conference paper at the 2013 Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association.
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vital pharmaceutical drug shortages, the focus of the news article examined how
Obama’s actions may mitigate the drug shortage problem (Harris, 2001), instead of
how President Obama’s unilateral decision potentially represented: (1) an attempt to
take over Congress’s role as the law-making body and (2) an abdication by Congress
of its constitutional authority.
We argue that public support for the institution of the presidency represents an
important constraint on presidents’ ability to make policies unilaterally. In addition
to potential constraints from Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court that prior stud-
ies found to be important (Howell, 2003, 2005; Howell and Lewis, 2002; Howell and
Pevehouse, 2007), we show that presidential diffuse support—a set of affective and
favorable attitudes toward the political institution—constrains the extent to which
presidents issue unilateral directives.2 Further, the impact of presidential institu-
tional support on unilateral actions varies depending on the salience of the particular
unilateral directives.
We proceed in several parts. First, we examine the extant literature on unilat-
eral powers and the circumstances under which presidents may decide to act unilater-
ally. We then offer a framework which links the unilateral presidency literature with
that on institutional support. Next, we present a discussion of the data and the em-
pirical models used. Last, we discuss the empirical results and what they contribute
to present knowledge on presidential unilateral action.
1.2 The Significance of Presidential Unilateral Powers
Although presidential scholars, following Neustadt (1990), have traditionally empha-
sized the weak formal powers of the president, recent work on unilateral powers sug-
gests that the Oval Office is anything but weak (Cooper, 2002, 2005; Howell, 2003,
2005; Mayer, 2001, 2009; Warber, 2006; Waterman, 2009). In fact, numerous scholars
2In this paper, we use the terms ”institutional support” and ”diffuse support”
interchangeably.
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see the recent increase in the use of unilateral powers as potentially “. . . emblematic
of an alarming trend in American politics—a propensity of presidents, especially dur-
ing times of crisis, to unilaterally impose their will on the American public” (Howell,
2003, 3).
Executive unilateral actions such as executive orders are “presidential directives
that require or authorize some action within the executive branch.” They are “pres-
idential edicts, legal instruments that create or modify laws, procedures, and policy
by fiat” (Mayer, 2001, 4). Presidential scholars agree that unilateral action has wide-
ranging policy implications. A brief survey of major presidential unilateral decisions
by executive orders in recent decades confirms that executive unilateral action often
has profound consequences:
• Via an executive order, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Exec-
utive Office of the President in 1939.
• In 1942, President Roosevelt ordered the evacuation, relocation, and internment
of Japanese-Americans during World War II.
• President Lyndon Johnson, with Executive Order 11246, instituted the nation’s
first affirmative action policy.
• In 2001, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, President
Bush created a new bureaucracy, the Office of Homeland Security, which coor-
dinates the efforts of federal agencies to combat terrorism.
Unilateral actions are written and often released outside of the public’s view. So
how does public support relate to presidential unilateral actions? In what follows, we
offer a theoretical framework that places unilateral presidential action in the context
of the political science literature on decision-making, particularly those from judicial
decision-making.
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1.3 Institutional Support and Decision-Making
In discussions of political support and its implications for democracy, Easton (1965b)
conceptualizes two general types of support: specific and diffuse. While may be diffi-
cult to empirically distinguish at times, Easton (1965b) suggests that specific support
relates to policy satisfaction. When, for instance, the public places specific demands
or inputs on the political system and receives, as quid pro quo, fulfillment of those
demands, specific support increases. Thus, “. . . wherever the input of support can be
closely associated with the satisfactions obtained from specific classes of output, we
shall designate it as specific support” (Easton, 1965b, 268).
In contrast, diffuse support is largely independent of the outputs, except in the
long run. It is a set of affective and favorable attitudes toward the system that is
largely unaffected by specific benefits or outputs. “[Diffuse support] forms a reservoir
of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs
to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants”
(Easton, 1965b, 273).
While Easton’s (1965b) conception of specific and diffuse support has received
its fair share of criticisms (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995), it remains an excellent
framework for studies of democratization and institutional legitimacy, particularly
in the comparative context (Chen, 2004; Dalton, 2004). Within American politics,
Easton’s (1965b) framework remains important in studies of judicial decision-making.
Students of the judicial decision-making literature argue that Supreme Court
justices follow a strategic behavior model, which states that justices rationally antic-
ipate the potential responses from Congress, the president, and the public (Caldeira
and Gibson, 1992; Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth, 2011; Epstein and Knight, 1998;
McGuire and Stimson, 2004). Specifically, McGuire and Stimson (2004) assert that
what impels the justices to follow public opinion are the Court’s expectations about
the future consequences of its decisions. In other words, the justices themselves take
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notice of public opinion, assess the potential impact of their decisions on future atti-
tudes and evaluations of the Court, and alter their behaviors accordingly. However,
recognizing that they “. . . must on occasions stand against the winds of public opin-
ion” (Caldeira and Gibson, 1992, 635), Supreme Court justices must be cautious in
how they craft their decisions so as not to lose their broad base of support from the
public. Thus, by maintaining some minimal level of broad, institutional support, the
Supreme Court has the capital to stand against public opinion, if necessary. The
question, then, is how we can apply the insights from this literature to unilateral
presidential directives?
1.4 How Institutional Support Constrains Unilateral Actions
Studies linking public opinion and presidents often come to one conclusion: despite
its constant struggle to carefully maintain a presidential “image” (Waterman, Wright,
and St. Clair, 1999) and to measure and to lead public opinion using strategies such as
direct appeals to the public and public relations (Edwards 1983), the presidency is in-
creasingly “out-of-touch” with the public and public opinion (Towle, 2004). However,
one problem with this literature is that they often only examine public opinion toward
the presidency with regard to presidential approval ratings. We question whether us-
ing such measures as presidential approval to assess the relationship between public
opinion and the presidency is sufficient, particularly when we make generalizations
with regard to the institution and not individual presidents. To make the type of
sweeping generalizations often made that the presidency is “out-of-touch” with the
American public, we must examine the relationship between the institution of the
presidency and the public. The distinction Easton (1965b) made regarding specific
support and diffuse support provides such an opportunity.
Conceptually, specific support and diffuse supports are simple concepts. To
achieve their political and policy goals, presidents must have the support of like-
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minded individuals who have similar goals. As those policy goals become political
reality and subsequently are implemented as public policy, they translate into higher
levels of approval and support for the incumbent president. This is evidence of spe-
cific support, which derives from policy agreements with the president’s actions and
policies. Operationally, the survey analog of specific support is questions relating to
a respondent’s approval/disapproval of a particular president, as well as the strength
of the approval/disapproval. In other words, when prior studies claim that the pres-
idency has become “out-of-touch” with public opinion, they assess this claim with
regard to presidential approval ratings.
However, as presidential approval ratings only measure the popularity level of a
given president, it does not measure overall support for the presidency as an institu-
tion. For example, Hibbs, Rivers, and Vasilatos (1982) assess how political support for
American presidents differs across different occupational and partisan groups. Using
presidential approval as a measure of political support, Hibbs, Rivers, and Vasilatos
(1982) find that group support for a specific president is contingent upon various
economic performance indicators, such as unemployment and inflation rates. In a
more recent study that uses presidential approval to measure political support, Lebo
and Cassino (2007) show that motivated-reasoning partisan groups do reward and
punish presidents for economic performance. However, Lebo and Cassino (2007) find
that the impact of economic indicators on presidential approval generally only applies
to presidents of the opposite political party. Thus, if presidential approval ratings
only indicate a specific president’s popularity at a given point in time, we would then
need some other indicators that measure popular support for the institution of the
presidency.
In contrast to specific support, diffuse support deals with support for the insti-
tution. Diffuse support is not policy-related. It is support for the overall legitimacy
and viability of the institution as a whole. Applied to the presidency, diffuse support
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is the set of affective and favorable attitudes toward the office of the presidency that,
at times, allows the chief executive to pass and implement policies contrary to public
expectations. While members of the public can tolerate some policy outputs from
the executive branch to which they are opposed, no individual president can take
diffuse support for granted, particularly when presidents continually push against the
boundaries of which the public allow by acting unilaterally. Specifically, with regard
to unilateral action, diffuse support represents a potential constraint on unilateral
actions primarily because presidents are cognizant of their boundaries and the extent
to which unilateral action can be used to achieve policy goals. As a result, while
presidents have increasingly turned toward unilateral actions as means of achieving
their policy initiatives and goals, there is a limit to which presidents can rely solely on
unilateral action. Specifically, we argue that when contemplating unilateral actions,
presidents must account for two factors: (1) their preferred policy outcomes and (2)
institutional support.
To begin, we must examine presidential unilateral action in the context of the
political environment within which presidents operate. First and foremost, unilat-
eral actions allow presidents to achieve their preferred policy outcomes.3 This means
that when other political strategies—e.g., legislations, direct appeals to the public,
and public relations—present greater challenges to accomplishing those policy objec-
tives, presidents will forego alternatives and issue unilateral directives. Of course,
presidents’ ability to issue unilateral directives is constrained by their relationship
with Congress (Fine and Warber, 2012; Howell, 2003, 2005). Second, presidents must
consider the future impacts that their unilateral decisions may have on public’s per-
ceptions of the institution. Elsewhere, scholars suggest that all presidents recognize
the distinct mark they each will leave on the institution. Not only do presidents share
3We acknowledge that unilateral directives are not the optimal method to make
public policies. Future presidents can easily overturn their predecessors’ policies via
unilateral directives of their own. However, when all else fails or when presidents
wish to shift policies quickly, unilateral actions then become attractive options.
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a sense of camaraderie with each other, irrespective of political parties (Gibbs and
Duffy, 2012), they also share similar desires to leave the office stronger than when
they found it (Pious, 1979). Thus, presidents’ decision calculation with respect to
unilateral actions should represent a balancing act between seeking their preferred
policy outcomes and maintaining and strengthening their institutional support.
Importantly, we make no strong assumptions about the public’s awareness of
presidential unilateral actions. We argue that the only requirement is that the public
might notice unilateral decisions that stand in stark contrast to public opinion. As
Howell (2003) show, the news media do report on presidential unilateral decisions;
it is plausible that those same media reports also describe the increasing frequency
of unilateral decisions. To summarize, the public does not need clear knowledge
that presidents are taking unilateral action. Presidential unilateral decisions should
reflect public opinion because presidents have an incentive to protect the institution’s
legitimacy. Thus, presidents should refrain from repeatedly issuing more unilateral
decisions on issues where the public reaction is likely to be strong.4.
How exactly does institutional support influence presidential unilateral direc-
tives? Specifically, the impact of diffuse support on presidential unilateral decisions
is akin to a threshold mechanism. At low levels of institutional support, below the
threshold, presidents will seek policies unilaterally. As Easton (1965b) notes, diffuse
support is not related to specific policies. The impact of specific policies, if any, on
diffuse support for the institution will only show up in the long run. Under these cir-
cumstances, if levels of institutional support are already low, presidents can do little
to further damage how the public feels toward the institution. Moreover, unilateral
4The argument that presidents can act freely so long as they remain within a given
boundary is widely established in prior research. For instance, Stimson’s (1991) dis-
cussion of the public’s “zone of acquiescence” suggests that policymakers can escape
public attention as long as they do not stray too far from public opinion. Similarly,
judicial literature that assesses institutional support and Supreme Court decision-
making offer comparable arguments (McGuire and Stimson, 2004; Mishler and Shee-
han, 1996)
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actions may represent the sole alternative available to the president. Conversely, dur-
ing times of high institutional support, above the threshold, presidents should also
seek policies unilaterally. The reasons are twofold. First, when operating within the
environments of high institutional support, presidents will have more political capital
to spend (Canes-Wrone and de Marchi, 2002; Johnson and Roberts, 2004; Kastellec,
Lax, and Phillips, 2010; Oliver, 1955; Smelcer, Steigerwalt, and Vining, N.d.) and
therefore can issue more unilateral directives to make public policies. Where pres-
idents are concerned, it is doubtful that any single unilateral actions, or series of
actions, can cause substantial harm to institutional support. Thus, it is only within a
certain threshold that institutional support constrain presidential unilateral actions.
Specifically, when the institution is within a certain level or range of institutional
support, presidents refrain from unilateral actions. Therefore, we expect: (1) when
level of institutional support is low, presidents issue more unilateral directives and (2)
when level of institutional support is high, presidents issue more unilateral actions.
While diffuse support is a potential source of constraint for presidential unilat-
eral actions, it is possible that not all unilateral actions are similarly constrained.
Here, we argue that there is a distinction between salient and non-salient unilateral
decisions. As Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth (2011) note in regard to Supreme Court
justices and judicial decision-making:
. . . many factors may lead justices to perceive that repeatedly issuing un-
popular decisions—for nonsalient cases—risks compromising the Court’s
institutional legitimacy. In other words, even if a case does not originally
attract public attention, the outcome may receive attention at a future
time period. Accordingly, considering public opinion in non-salient cases
may help preserve the Court’s reservoir of diffuse support, allowing in-
creased latitude to issue decisions that might contradict public opinion in
select salient cases that hold clearer political or personal significance (81,
10
emphasis in original)
We argue that logic holds for the presidency.5 Unilateral decisions should gen-
erally reflect public opinion in non-salient cases in order to maintain and/or to
strengthen institutional support. Such strategies allow presidents to issue contro-
versial unilateral directives should the need arises.
As with previous works (Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth, 2011; Howell, 2003;
Fine and Warber, 2012), we define salience as those unilateral actions reported on the
front page of the New York Times the day following the decision. If maintaining the
reservoir of diffuse support allows presidents to, at times, issue unilateral directives
contrary to public expectations, then we should expect the above hypothesis to hold
only for non-salient unilateral decisions. Unilateral directives that stand in stark
contrast to public opinion are more likely to be reported by the news media, and
therefore become part of the public’s consciousness. As a result, when we disaggregate
unilateral actions into those that are politically salient and those that are not, we
should see that diffuse support only constrains non-salient unilateral actions. Thus,
we expect institutional support to only constrains non-salient unilateral actions.
1.5 Data and Model
1.5.1 Dependent Variables
Empirical works predicting the exercises of presidential unilateral power typically
use some form of count model analysis or models involving categorical dependent
5We acknowledge that the U.S. Supreme Court and the presidency are distinct
institutions. Presidents, for instance, are subject to electoral constraints, whereas
Supreme Court justices are not. However, the logic on how public opinion should
matter in relation to decision making is transferable, despite the differences in in-
stitutional structure. Since the current focus is on institutional/diffuse support,
rather than support for specific policies (or court decisions), the important ques-
tion is whether actors in the respective institutions care about the overall institution
as a whole. In this particular instance, the answer is yes for both the presidency and
the Court.
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variables (Howell, 2003, 2005; Howell and Lewis, 2002; Mayer, 2001). We follow
this convention and use the numbers of executive orders issued in a given year as the
dependent variable. This is consistent with existing works in the unilateral presidency
literature (Fine and Warber, 2012; Howell, 2003, 2005). Figure 1.1 presents a graph of
the three dependent variables used in the analyses, as well as the primary explanatory
variable.
Figure 1.1: Number of Executive Orders Issued Annually
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This figure presents the distributions of the dependent variables and the institutional
support measure.
The first dependent variable is the total number of executive orders issued by
the president in a given year. Using data provided by the Policy Agendas Project,
and augmented by presidential executive orders data in (Ragsdale, 1998), this variable
measures the total number of executive orders issued annually from 1981 to 2001.6
6Due to data limitations imposed by our primary independent variable, we re-
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To assess whether there is a distinction between salient and non-salient uni-
lateral directives, we include separate measures for those executive orders that were
reported by a media outlet and those that were not. The second dependent variable
is the total number of salient executive orders as coded by Howell (2003, 2005). Via
a series of coding sweeps, Howell (2003, 2005) was able to determine the number of
executive orders that were reported on the front page of the New York Times.7 The
third dependent variable measures the total number of nonsalient executive orders,
i.e., orders not reported by the New York Times. This variable is the difference be-
tween the total number of executive orders issued annually and the total number of
salient executive orders.
1.6 Explanatory Variables
1.6.1 Institutional Support
How do we measure presidential institutional support? Ideally, one would have sur-
vey data similar to those that exist in the judicial and the comparative literature.8
The survey questionnaire would ask respondents to express their level of support for
the institution. Absence such data, however, we must be creative in generating mea-
sures of presidential institutional support. Specifically, we exploit the information
contained within the feeling thermometer question asked by the American National
stricted our analyses to observations that fall between 1981 and 2001.
7For detailed coding scheme, see Howell (2003).
8 For example, in their study of public attitudes toward various American political
institutions, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) conducted a nationwide survey in 1992
and used both an approval question and a feeling thermometer question to gauge
public support for the person and the institution, respectively. The specific wording
of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s (1995) survey question to assess institutional support
was: “Now, I’ve asked you to rate some people in government, but sometimes when
we talk about parts of the government in Washington, like the Supreme Court, the
presidency, and the Congress, we don’t mean the people currently serving in office, we
mean the institutions themselves, no matter who’s in office. These institutions have
their own buildings, historical traditions, and purposes laid out in the Constitution.
I’d like to know how warm or cold you feel toward these institutions, not the people
currently in office.” Unfortunate for us, data do not exist longitudinally.
13
Election Studies (ANES).
In contrast to asking the public to express whether they support or disapprove of
the president’s current job performance, which suggests largely policy-related agree-
ment with the president’s actions, a feeling thermometer can arguably contain more
information. Consider this simple exercise: what does it mean to feel “warm” or
“cold” toward a person (or an institution)? Of course, one potential answer is whether
you agree with that person’s (or institution’s) opinions or arguments(or policies be-
liefs). However, one’s warmth toward others could also derive from other shared
similarities beside policy beliefs. To extend the analogy to institutions, one’s overall
feelings toward the institution itself also contribute to how warm one feels toward
that institution.9
If a feeling thermometer picks up policy agreements, we can then use it to gen-
erate the diffuse support variable. Using data from the ANES, the diffuse support
variable is generated from the residuals that are left over after regressing the feeling
thermometer measure on a series of variables that explain policy agreements with the
president. Specifically, we first regress the feeling thermometer on: (1) Party identi-
fication; (2) Education level; (3) Region; (4) Gender; (5) Race; (6) Religion; and (7)
Presidential Approval Ratings.10 In other words, we try to account for explanations of
9 As another example, consider what usually happens when the President of the
United States walks into a room. The first reaction of the occupants inside are to
stand up, if sitting, and acknowledge the president’s entrance. This is usually the case
regardless of partisanship. When this happens, the acknowledgement is due more so
to the office of which the current president represents than to one’s specific alignment
with the current president’s policies.
10 One may object to using the residuals to construct new explanatory variables
to be used in some other models. In response, consider a typical definition of a
commonly-used model fit statistic: R2. According to Greene (2012), the R2 is
bounded between 0 and 1 and measures the proportion of the total variation in the
dependent variable that is explained by the variations in the independent variables
in the model. By extension, the residuals consist of the information contained in the
dependent variable not explained in the model. This is what we exploit when creating
a measure for presidency institutional support. Stated differently, the random noises
that we assume the model residuals to represent are not truly random. The residuals
are random noises with respect to our model only ; in other words, the residuals do
not impact the results of our model. Moreover, the residuals can be substantively
important. They are what we cannot explain with the variables in our model.
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policy agreements with the president and strip them out of the feeling thermometer.
Consequently, what is left of the feeling thermometer represents diffuse support plus
some noise. Next, to convert the residuals of the individual-level feeling thermometer
measure in the ANES into an aggregate measure of diffuse support, we first squared
the residuals from the feeling thermometer and then divide the residuals squared by
the total number of respondents in the ANES surveys. As the feeling thermometer
residuals prior to squaring have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, sim-
ply summing the residuals will produce a diffuse support value of zero; therefore, I
squared the residual for each respondent prior to summing the feeling thermometer
residuals for each ANES year.11 Also, since the total number of respondents for each
ANES survey differs from year to year, we divide the sum of the feeling thermometer
residuals squared by the total number of respondents for that ANES year. Last, we
normalize the variable to be between 0 and 1.
Unfortunately, ANES did not conduct a survey in 1981, 1999, and 2001. This
reduces the number of years, and thus the total number of observations in the subse-
quent analyses, in the dataset from 21 to 18. Table 1.1 provides summary statistics on
the diffuse support measure, as well as the dependent variables and some important
control variables. Last, in case the influence of institutional support on unilateral ac-
tions has a plateauing effect, we also included a squared institutional support variable
in the analyses.
1.6.2 Control Variables
Unlike the formal law-making process, unilateral actions like the executive orders or
signing statements are not permanent; that is, the next president can reverse the
action by issuing a new executive order. This could be one potential explanation why
11 Alternatively, rather than first squaring the residuals prior to summing, we can
instead add to each residual some constant value, such as 1 or 5. Extensive robustness
checks using these alternative institutional support measures show not substantive
different to results shown later.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total EOs 21 47.19 11.51 35 76
Salient EOs 21 10.24 5.23 5 28
Non-Salient EOs 21 36.95 8.60 24 51
Institutional Support 18 .54 .31 0 1
Approval 21 55.82 9.17 40.33 71.79
Ideological Difference (House) 21 0.74 0.14 0.35 0.86
Policy Change Potential (House) 21 14.49 6.56 3.92 21.42
Ideological Difference (Senate) 21 0.70 0.16 0.32 0.95
Policy Change Potential (Senate) 21 9.05 2.78 0.22 12.61
*This table presents the summary statistics for the dependent variables and some
important independent and control variables.
presidential approval levels do not apply to unilateral actions. Presidents often act
unilaterally when they are in a position of weakness in relation to Congress. Thus, if
presidents have high approval ratings that facilitate getting bills through Congress,
they would most likely forgo unilateral action and seek policy changes via legislations
(Ouyang and Waterman, N.d.).
In addition to presidential approval, the model also accounts for potential ex-
planations for presidential unilateral actions suggested by Howell (2003, 2005): ideo-
logical difference between the president and chambers of Congress and congressional
gridlock (Ouyang and Waterman, N.d.). The ideological difference variables between
the president and the House of Representatives and the Senate are generated from
DW-NOMINATE scores by Poole and Rosenthal (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984, 1985,
1997). Specifically, we calculate the ideological difference variables by taking the ab-
solute value of the difference between the president’s ideology score and the chamber
median. For instance, to calculate the ideological difference variable for Reagan in
1981 and the House, we first subtract the chamber median ideological score from Rea-
gan’s ideological score. We then take the absolute value of that difference in scores
between Reagan and the House median.
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The second set of control variables measures congressional gridlock in the House
and the Senate. Following Brady, Cooper, and Hurley (1979), we measure gridlock
using the Legislative Potential for Policy Change (LPPC). To calculate the LPPC
for the House and the Senate, I multiply the percentage of the majority party in
the House and the Senate, respectively, by the degree of cohesiveness within the
majority party in the chamber and subtract from it the percentage of the minority
party multiplied by the cohesiveness within the minority party.12 Lastly, following
the convention in the unilateral presidency literature, we include indicator variables
for divided government, presidential and midterm election years, and the Reagan and
G.H.W. Bush administrations.
1.6.3 Model
With the dependent variables set as the number of executive orders issued annu-
ally, the appropriate empirical model of analysis is an event-count model. Strictly
speaking, the extremely small sample size—18 years of executive orders from 1981-
2001—make inferences challenging.13 However, King (1988) shows that event count
models can provide unbiased estimates of the parameters of interest, even with sample
sizes as small as 10 observations. Strictly speaking, small sample sizes in event-count
models do not bias the coefficients; they do, however, increase the inefficiency in the
model, leading to greater standard errors and decrease the model’s ability to show
statistically significant results. Discussed more fully in the appendix, we estimate
the model using negative binomial as diagnostics tests show overdispersion in the
data. In addition to the primary explanatory variable of interest—the level of insti-
tutional support—the model controls for: (1) presidential approval ratings; (2) the
12 LPPC (House/Senate) = [% majority party (House/Senate) ∗ majority party
cohesiveness (House/Senate)] [% minority party (House/Senate) ∗ minority party
cohesiveness (House/Senate)].
13 Although there were 21 observations in the initial dataset, missing data for years
1981, 1999, and 2001 reduce the final number of observations in the analyses down
to 18.
17
ideological difference between the president and the House of Representatives; (3) the
House of Representatives’ legislative potential for policy change; (4) the ideological
difference between the president and the Senate; and (5) the Senate’s legislative po-
tential for policy change. The model also includes as control variables indicators for
divided government, presidential election year, and midterm election years. Last, the
model controls for president-specific effects with indicator or dummy variables for the
Reagan and the G.H.W. Bush administrations, respectively.
1.7 Analysis and Results
Table 1.2 presents the results of the analyses where the dependent variable is the total
number of executive orders issued annually. We fitted three models.14 The House
Model fits a model consistent with existing accounts of presidential unilateral actions,
including the congress variables for the House only. The Senate Model fits a similar
model, with Senate variables. Model 3 combines both the House and the Senate
variables and our primary independent variable, presidential institutional support.
Model fit statistics show that The Current Model fits the data better and is the
preferred model.
Though not the primary focus of this paper, the differences that exist between
the House and the Senate models reflect the inconsistencies in the unilateral litera-
ture. Deering and Maltzman (1999), for instance, find that as the ideological distance
between the president and the House and the Senate, respectively, increases, presi-
dents issue more executive orders. Conversely, though Fine and Warber (2012) also
find presidents to issue more executive orders when confronted with growing ideolog-
ical distance with the Senate, this is only true with major policy executive orders.
Using ideological distance between the president and the Senate to explain the num-
14 We also conducted a series of robustness checks of our model. Results remain
robust to a variety of different model specifications. See appendix for results of
robustness checks.
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Table 1.2: Impact of Institutional Support on the Total Number of Executive Orders
Issued Annually (1981 - 2001)
Explanatory House Senate Current
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Institutional Support −0.611∗∗∗
(.158)
Support × Support 0.412
(0.259)
Approval 0.001 −0.005 −0.003
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
Divided Gov’t 3.448∗∗∗ −0.597∗∗∗ −0.274
(0.903) (0.061) (2.221)
Presidential −0.021 −0.019 −0.122∗∗∗
Election Year (0.103) (0.131) (0.023)
Midterm −0.127 −0.047∗∗∗ 0.063
Election Year (0.082) (0.014) (0.061)
Reagan 1.106∗∗∗ −0.033 0.958∗∗∗
Administration (0.260) (0.131) (0.295)
Bush (G.H.W.) 0.213∗∗∗ −0.031 1.296∗∗∗
Administration (0.042) (0.122) (0.569)
Ideological Difference −9.778∗∗∗ 3.832
(House) (2.370) (7.240)
Legislative Potential for 0.029∗∗∗ −0.048
Policy Change (House) (0.008) (0.041)
Ideological Difference 0.687t −5.155∗∗
(Senate) (0.360) (2.558)
Legislative Potential for −0.034 0.131∗∗∗
Policy Change (Senate) (0.024) (0.033)
# of Executive Ordert−1 0.004 0.005 −0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 6.797∗∗∗ 4.249∗∗∗ 4.047∗∗∗
(0.699) (0.973) (1.147)
N 20 20 18
AIC 133.302 134.071 114.915
BIC 137.285 138.054 114.586
Log Likelihood −62.651 −63.035 −52.958
Note: Negative binomial estimated. The dependent variable is the total number of
executive orders issued annually by the president. t <.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
(Two-Tailed Tests). Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors adjusted for clus-
tering within presidential administrations reported in parentheses.
ber of symbolic and routine executive orders, or all published executive orders, Fine
and Warber (2012) find that presidents issue fewer executive orders as ideological
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distance with the Senate grows. Resolving this important debate is beyond the scope
of this paper.
Returning to our principal focus, we show in Model 3 that the House and the
Senate exhibit different dynamics on the extent to which presidents act unilaterally.
When accounting for both the ideological distance between the president and the
House and the Senate, respectively, we find that only the Senate ideological distance
significantly impact the total number of executive orders issued.15 More importantly,
Model 3 supports our hypothesis. Institutional support impacts the extent to which
presidents act unilaterally. How substantial is this constraint?
To assess the substantive impact, Figure 1.2 presents the substantive effects of
institutional support on the total number of executive orders issued annually, while
holding all other variables at their respective means. The substantive impact shows
a quadratic structure. Supporting our hypothesis, presidents issue more executive
orders at low levels of institutional support. As the level of institutional support
increases, the number of executive orders issued decreases. Eventually, the decrease
in the number of executive orders issued meets a threshold, change direction, and
begins to increase as the level of institutional support reaches the upper bound in the
dataset. At high levels of institutional of institutional support, presidents also issue
more unilateral directives.
The threshold constraining mechanism is substantial. On average, presidents
issue 53 executive orders when the level of institutional support is 0. When insti-
tutional support reaches .8 in the dataset, presidents issue 42 executive orders; a
15 As Fine and Warber (2012) note, including ideological distance variables for both
the House and Senate induce multicollinearity in the model. However, as discussed
more fully in the appendix, multicollinearity can sometimes be desirable (Conlisk,
1971), especially if one can expect the House and the Senate to have the theoretic
capacity to impact presidential decision-making separately and distinctly. Moreover,
multicollinearity in the model only reduces the model’s ability to find statistical sig-
nificant results. To that end, the presence of multicollinearity, along with significant
results, means that the model can only underestimate the true impact of institutional
support on unilateral actions.
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Figure 1.2: Substantive Impact of Institutional Support on Executive Orders
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difference of 11 executive orders. Considering that presidents issue on average 47 ex-
ecutive orders in total annually, 11 executive orders would represent 23.4% or almost
one quarter of executive orders issued annually, an important substantive impact.
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1.7.1 Robustness Tests
To ensure that our findings do not result from various modeling decisions, we con-
ducted a series of tests to assess robustness. Table 1.3 presents the results of those
robustness tests. In short, our results are robust to various model specifications.
Model 1 presents the results of the negative binomial regression model with just
two independent variables: the presidential institutional support variable and the t
- 1 lagged value of the dependent variable, to account for the time-serial nature of
the dependent variable. Model 2 adds presidential approval to the previous model.
Model 3 adds another control variable for divided government. Model 4 adds a series
of dummy variables for: (1) presidential election year; (2) a dummy for midterm
election year; (3) a control (dummy) for the Reagan administration years; and (4)
a control for G.H.W. Bush administration years (Fine and Warber, 2012). Model 5
adds congress variables previously found to be important in the unilateral presidency
literature: the ideological difference between the House chamber and the president;
the legislative potential for policy change in the House; the ideological difference
between the Senate chamber and the president; and the legislative potential for policy
change in the Senate (Fine and Warber, 2012; Howell, 2003). Model 6 adds a squared
term for the presidency institutional support variable.
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1.7.2 Salient vs. Non-Salient Executive Orders
Is there a distinction between the impact of institutional support on salient vs. non-
salient unilateral actions? Table 1.4 reports the results of two negative binomial
models, where the dependent variables are the total number of salient executive orders
presidents issue annually as reported by the New York Times and the total number
of non-salient executive orders that were not reported, respectively. The Salient
Model (Model 4) in Table 1.4 presents the results of the negative binomial model
when the dependent variable is the total number of executive orders issued that was
reported in the New York Times. The Non-Salient Model (Model 5) reports the
results where the dependent variable is the total number of non-salient executive
orders. Results support our expectations regarding salient vs. non-salient unilateral
directives. Institutional support impacts unilateral actions in markedly different ways,
depending on whether the action is salient.
Table 1.4 reports the varying influence of institutional support on salient vs.
non-salient unilateral actions. While institutional support do indeed constrain non-
salient unilateral actions, the effect is in the opposite direction with respect to salient
executive orders. Toward higher levels of institutional support, presidents are more
likely to issue more salient executive orders. Elsewhere, scholars have noted that
actions by an institution will track public opinion and public support for that in-
stitution only when the actions will not be politically salient (Casillas, Enns, and
Wohlfarth, 2011). Results from Model 4 thus are consistent with prior literature on
institutional support and actions by that institution.
We present in Figure 1.3 the substantive impact of institutional support on the
salient and non-salient executive orders, respectively, while holding at their respective
means all other variables. As with results from earlier, institutional support impacts
presidential unilateral actions considerably. With respect to non-salient executive
orders, when institutional support is at 0, presidents issue an average of 47 executive
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Table 1.4: Varying Impacts of Diffuse Suppose on Salient vs. Non-Salient Executive
Orders
Explanatory Salient Non-Salient
Variables (4) (5)
Institutional Support 0.444∗∗ −0.834∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.219)
Support × Support 0.045 0.483
(0.337) (0.294)
Approval −0.008 −0.001
(0.009) (0.006)
Divided Government 1.715t −0.442
(1.011) (2.835)
Presidential −0.306 −0.075
(0.271) (0.089)
Midterm 0.159 0.033
(0.196) (0.107)
Reagan 2.018∗∗∗ 0.812∗
Administration (0.123) (0.325)
Bush (G.H.W.) 2.063∗∗∗ 1.162
Administration (0.233) (0.706)
Ideological Difference 1.967 3.648
(House) (3.177) (9.381)
Legislative Potential for −0.050∗ −0.046
Policy Change (House) (0.024) (0.053)
Ideological Difference −9.687∗∗∗ −4.280
(Senate) (0.621) (3.262)
Legislative Potential for 0.137∗∗∗ 0.135 ∗ ∗∗
Policy Change (Senate) (0.041) (0.051)
# of Executive Ordert−1 −0.030∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.006) (0.007)
Constant 5.633∗∗∗ 3.256∗
(0.550) (1.583)
N 18 18
AIC 79.801 110.392
BIC 81.582 113.063
Log Likelihood −37.901 −52.196
Note: Negative binomial estimated. The dependent variable in Model 1 is the total
number of salient executive orders issued annually that were reported by the New
York Times. The dependent variable in Model 2 is the total number of executive
orders issued annually that were not reported by the New York Times. Models
also account for presidential fixed effects. t <.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
(Two-Tailed Tests). Huber/White/sandwich robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering within presidential administrations reported in parentheses.
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orders. As institutional support increases, the number of non-salient executive orders
issued decreases to 32 when the level of institutional support reaches the threshold
level of .8. The difference of 15 non-salient executive orders when levels of institutional
support is between 0 and .8 is considerable. Presidents issue an average of non-salient
executive orders annually; 15 executive orders would represent 40.5% of non-salient
executive orders issued annually. As level of institutional support continues beyond
.8, presidents issue more executive orders.
Looking at salient executive orders, Model 4 in Table 1.4 and Figure 1.3 tell
a markedly different story. Compared to non-salient executive orders, institutional
support has a fairly linear impact on the number of salient executive orders issued
annually. The difference in the number of salient executive orders issued between the
lowest level of presidential institutional support and the highest level is 5 executive
orders, or approximately 50% of salient executive orders issued annually.
Thus, as expected, institutional support is conditional on the salience of uni-
lateral directives. The opportunity for presidents at times to stand against public
pressure and issue salient unilateral directives is precisely the core argument why
presidential unilateral actions should generally reflect public opinion. Presidents wish
to build up and maintain sufficient reservoirs (i.e., institutional support) to use when
contemplating unilateral and even controversial issues and solutions (Easton, 1965a;
Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth, 2011). For example, consider President Truman’s
decision to integrate the military via Executive Orders 9980 and 9981. While Tru-
man is credited in contemporary accounts as taking the first critical step in ensuring
racial equality in the military, Truman unilateral decisions were not well-received at
the time (Foster, 2008). One notable opponent was the Army Chief of Staff General
Omar Bradley, who “. . . remarked that the Army ‘was not place for social experiments’
” (Foster, 2008). What then allowed Truman’s decision to integrate the military to
withstand political and social pressures? Part of the explanation is that the institu-
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tion of the presidency possesses sufficient reservoir, which allows the occupant in the
Oval Office (i.e., Truman) to act against political, social, and public pressures.
1.8 Conclusion
Scholars studying presidential unilateral powers have learned much about the uses
of unilateral actions. Examining presidential unilateral actions within various polit-
ical contexts, prior studies identify two circumstances when presidents are likely to
act unilaterally. First, presidents will exercise their unilateral powers—i.e., executive
orders, signing statements, executive agreements, executive proclamations, national
security directives, or executive memoranda—when a large ideological gap exists be-
tween the president and Congress (Howell, 2003, 2005; Howell and Lewis, 2002).
Issuing unilateral directives when the president and Congress differ ideologically thus
are strategies that presidents can adopt to implement policy changes. Second, prior
work suggests that presidents are also more likely to act unilaterally when Congress
may be poised to enact policy changes that the president opposes (Howell, 2003, 2005;
Howell and Lewis, 2002). In these cases, the purpose of presidential unilateral actions
is that of moderation. By preempting proposed congressional actions, presidents can
induce more moderate policy shifts than those preferred by Congress.
Consistent with existing accounts of presidential unilateral actions, we find that
the ideological differences between the president and the House and the Senate do
indeed impact the number of executive orders presidents issue (Deering and Maltz-
man, 1999; Fine and Warber, 2012; Howell, 2003, 2005; Howell and Lewis, 2002).
However, whereas existing works limit attention mostly to the U.S. Senate, we find
that the House and the Senate,respectively, exhibit different dynamics on presidential
unilateral actions.
More importantly, we demonstrate that institutional support does constrain the
extent to which presidents act unilaterally. As scholars show, while presidents sit at
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the apex of the executive branch and therefore are the titular head of the numerous
bureaucratic entities that purport to carry out presidential directives, presidents face
numerous challenges to policy implementation and regularly take steps to overcome
bureaucratic inertia (Howell, 2003, 2005; Howell and Lewis, 2002; Lewis, 2003, 2008):
Having issued a directive, presidents do not sit idly by, hoping that bu-
reaucrats will step forward and advance their policy goals, languishing in
thought that they probably will not. Instead, presidents often follow up
with additional orders and rule changes, directing specific personnel to
fulfill specific tasks within specific agencies (Howell, 2005).
While presidents use unilateral directives to further impact bureaucratic respon-
siveness, they operate within the constraints imposed by public opinion and public
support for the institution. In short, while unilateral directives—e.g., executive or-
ders, signing statements, proclamations, etc.—offer presidents opportunities to make
public policies unilaterally, presidents must take pain to carefully cultivate and main-
tain a reservoir of institutional support with which to use to stand against various
political and public pressures, if necessary. The means to the maintaining such a
reservoir are to use unilateral actions strategically. Presidential unilateral directives
should generally reflect public sentiments, except in the cases of special and extenuat-
ing circumstances that presidents feel the necessity to go against political and public
pressures, as in the case of Truman and the integration of the military.
In addition to the unilateral presidency literature specifically, and the broader
literature in political science, results above also have implications for works in law and
in popular literature. One current debate concerns the impact of increasing unilateral
actions on democracy and the American political process. Some have even suggested
that the increasing uses of unilateral directives by American presidents has resulted in
a “cult of the presidency” (Healy, 2008). The current project adds to this debate by
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noting that the public is never far from the president’s mind. Specifically, before one
can definitively describe the impact of presidential unilateral actions on the political
system, one first must fully ascertain the relation between unilateral directives and
the public more broadly.
1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Checking Validity of Institutional Support Measure
Table 1.5: Institutional Support and Lagged Values of Presidential Approval
# of Lagged Corr. Coef.
0 0.06
1 −0.05
2 0.28
3 0.40
To confirm that the diffuse support measure actually measures what it intends
to, and not just random noises, we assess the correlation between the diffuse sup-
port measure and lagged values of presidential approval. As Easton (1965b) suggests,
though diffuse support and specific support are fundamentally two distinct concepts,
one should expect specific support at time t to ultimately filter into diffuse support—
i.e., agreements with one presidential administration’s policies should eventually filter
into higher levels of support for the institution in general. Table 1.5 confirms. Ad-
mittedly a crude validation attempt, Table 1.5 suggests that however that the diffuse
support measure is capturing some aspects of diffuse support. Given diffuse support
and specific support are two distinct concepts, we should expect little correlation
between the constructed diffuse support measure and presidential approval. As Table
1.5 shows, diffuse support is barely correlated with presidential approval when both
are at time t. Furthermore, though we expect little to no correlation with diffuse
support and presidential approval, we expect diffuse support to more strongly corre-
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late with lagged values of presidential values. Diffuse support becomes more strongly
correlated with lagged values of presidential approval. At time t-3, the correlation
coefficient between diffuse support and presidential approval increases to .40. Again,
while this is an admittedly crude attempt to validate the constructed diffuse support
measure, it does instill some confidence that the diffuse support measure is capturing
some aspects of what Easton (1965b) meant by diffuse support.
1.9.2 “The Multicollinearity Problem”
As mentioned above, the decision to examine separately the effects of the House and
the Senate on presidential executive orders potentially induce multicollinearity in our
models. This may be a fair criticism. The correlation between the House ideolog-
ical difference and the Senate ideological difference is high at .792 with a p-value
< .001. Likewise, the House legislative potential for policy change and the Senate
legislative potential for policy change are also highly correlated at .498 with a p-value
< .05. However, while these variables are highly correlated, they are not problem-
atic insofar as they result from an unlucky sample. Similar to Bartilow and Voss’s
(2009) arguments regarding democracy measures, we expect measures of the House
and Senate to be highly correlated because “. . . they are not theoretically distinct”
(115). To some degree, we expect correlations between the House and the Senate
variables because the representatives and senators are often put in office by the same
electorate at election times. Thus, despite the collinearity between the House and
the Senate variables, by allowing the House and the Senate, respectively, to express
different dynamics on how presidents use executive orders, separating congressional
measures of legislative potency into those for the House and those for the Senate is
sound theoretically and eliminates omitted variable bias.
We gain further confidence in allowing for multicollinearity in the analyses pre-
sented above in that, at times, multicollinearity is desirable (Conlisk, 1971; Gold-
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berger, 1991). As Goldberger (1991) notes, “Multicollinearity may make the esti-
mates of individual βjs imprecise, while facilitating the precise estimation of partic-
ular combinations of the elements of β” (250). Conlisk (1971) discusses further why
researchers may be interested in linear combinations of β. Suppose that there are
two goods β1 and β2, “suppose further that the economist is interested primarily in
the total marginal propensity to consumer β1 + β2 and secondarily in the separate
[marginal propensity to consumption’s] β1 and β2” (Conlisk, 1971, 396). The parallel
to Conlisk’s (1971) economic example where the interest is actually on the βs com-
bined and only secondarily on the βs individually is the distinction we made above
regarding the House and the Senate variables. While it would be hard to clearly
differentiate between the House and Senate variables as they are not “theoretically
distinct,” it should be obvious that some amount of collinearity between the House
and Senate variables should be expected, and welcomed, as little can be done in one
chamber of the legislature without the summary consent of the other. In regard to
presidential executive orders, for maximum effectiveness, any response from Congress
as a reaction to presidential unilateral actions must take place with the consent of
both chambers. Thus, multicollinearity in the analyses above is not so much a “prob-
lem” as they are actually desirable.
Copyright c© Yu Ouyang, 2015.
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Chapter 2 Judicial Influences and the Unilateral Presidency: A Dynamic
Model of Executive-Judicial Interactions
Abstract
What impact, if any, does the court have on presidential unilateral power?
Questions relating to the expansion and exercise of executive power remain
a perennial concern in political science. Existing studies of presidential
unilateral actions tend to focus on the relations between the president
and Congress. However, to date, the literature has not yet assessed em-
pirically executive-judicial relations. This is surprising, considering the
varied studies that show the importance of judicial-executive relations.
We offer a dynamic model to represent the relationship between the pres-
ident’s desire for and uses of unilateral authorities and the court’s ability
and capacity to check executive power. Simulations result in three pre-
dictions. First, presidents will prefer unilateral actions when the court
imposes fewer constraints on the executive. Second, decreased capacity
for unilateral action does not entirely undo the ability or the desire for
unilateral behavior. Last, shifts in executive behavior and unilateral ac-
tivism are the strongest under those scenarios where the court has greater
capacity to expand unilateral authority.
2.1 Introduction
What impact, if any, does the court have on presidential unilateral power? Questions
relating to the expansion and exercise of executive power remain a perennial concern
in political science. During the height of the Korean conflict, President Harry Truman
issued Executive Order 10340 on April 8, 1954, directing then Secretary of Commerce
Charles Sawyer to seize and nationalize the nation’s steel industry. Concerned by
the implications of a steel shortage on domestic development, national security, and
the ongoing conflict on the Korea peninsula, Truman’s decision was a response to
the failed collective bargaining negotiations between the steel industry and the steel
worker’s union. History would ultimately immortalized Truman’s decisions, and the
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associated controversies, in the Supreme Court case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer (1952) 343 U.S. 579.
Though many point to Truman and the Steel Seizure case as a clear example
of presidential expansionism and aggrandizement that was subsequently struck down
by the U.S. Supreme Court (Corwin, 1953; Devins and Fisher, 2002), the case also
illustrates when the executive branch neglects to account for the preferences of the
justices on the Supreme Court. Further, the Truman case demonstrates the impor-
tance of court influence on unilateral decision-making. In particular, I argue that,
when considering the use of unilateral directives to make public policies, the court
potentially has considerable influence on the president’s decision to issue unilateral
directives.
Existing studies of presidential unilateral actions tend to focus on the relation-
ship between the president and Congress (Howell, 2005; Deering and Maltzman, 1999;
Fine and Warber, 2012). Many scholars note that as the president’s legislative po-
sition in Congress weakens, presidents are more likely to issue executive orders to
bypass the legislature (Deering and Maltzman, 1999; Howell, 2003, 2005; Howell and
Lewis, 2002; Mayer, 2001), Other works find similar relations regarding both sign-
ing statements (Cooper, 2005; Kelley and Marshall, 2010) and proclamations (Belco
and Rottinghaus, 2009; Rottinghaus and Lim, 2009; Rottinghaus and Maier, 2007).
However, to date, the literature has yet to assess empirically executive-judicial rela-
tions. This is surprising, considering the varied studies which show the importance
of judicial-executive relations (Scigliano, 1971; Whittington, 2007).
Understanding executive-judicial relations is important. Though courts gen-
erally avoid involvement in challenging executive decisions, and typically rule in
favor of presidential actions, the absence of observable interactions does not mean
that political actors account for the preferences of the opposing actor(s). Consider,
for instance, the adjustments of federal administrative decisions to account for con-
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gressional preferences. Wood and Waterman (1991) refer to this as “anticipative
responses.” Congress does not have to engage in continuous, potentially costly over-
sight of the federal bureaucracy to ensure that bureaucratic outputs are consistent
with legislative preferences as administrators themselves recognize the potential back-
lashes that may result from straying too far from congressional preferences. Cameron
(2000) finds this to also be the case with respect to presidential veto bargaining and
congressional legislations. In short, that direct executive-judicial confrontations are
rare does not also imply a similar absence of political influence.
To assess the potential impact of the court on presidential unilateral action, We
offer a dynamic model to represent the interaction between the president’s desire for
and uses of unilateral authority and the court’s ability and capacity to check executive
powers. Simulations result in three predictions. First, presidents will prefer unilateral
action when the court imposes fewer constraints on the executive. Second, decreased
capacity for unilateral action does not entirely undo either the ability or the desire
for unilateral behavior. Last, shifts in executive behavior and unilateral activism are
the strongest under those scenarios where the court has greater capacity to expand
unilateral authority.
This paper advances the unilateral presidency literature both theoretically and
methodologically. While existing works shed considerable light on how congressional
factors influence unilateral behavior, we know little about the potential impact that
the court has on presidential unilateralism. This paper links the courts literature with
that on the unilateral presidency to advance a formal model of executive-judicial inter-
actions. Methodologically, I introduce a modeling strategy common in international
relations and the biological sciences to the study of the presidency. Presidents do
not operate and make decisions in a political vacuum. Instead, the process is fre-
quently endogenous, as interactions between the executive and other political actors
are better characterized as sets of action-reaction dynamics.
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The manuscript proceeds in several parts. First, I begin with a brief review
of the unilateral presidency literature. Then, I offer a discussion why modeling ap-
proaches common in ecology and international relations can be used to model exec-
utive behavior. Third, I present a discussion of the formal model, by linking general
theoretical arguments to mathematical representations. I then present a number of
simulations to illustrate the over-time patterns in judicial-executive interactions and
unilateral powers. Based on these analyses, I derive hypotheses based on numerical
simulations of the model.
2.2 The Significance of Presidential Unilateral Powers
Presidents typically have considerable discretion in making unilateral decisions. Al-
though presidential scholars have traditionally emphasized the weak formal powers
of the presidency, recent works on unilateral power suggests that the Oval Office is
anything but weak (Cooper, 2002; Fine and Warber, 2012; Mayer, 2001). By unilat-
eral power, we mean those first-actor policy authorities which the executive possesses
(e.g, executive orders, signing statements, proclamations, etc.) that are not explicitly
enumerated in the Constitution. For example, Howell (2003) shows how the shrink-
ing and expansion of the legislative gridlock interval results in opportunities for the
president to make policies by executive fiat. In fact, numerous scholars see the recent
increase in the uses of unilateral power as potentially “. . . emblematic of an alarm-
ing trend in American politics—a propensity of presidents, especially during times of
crisis, to unilaterally impose their will on the American people” (Howell, 2003, 3).
Presidential scholars agree that unilateral actions has wide-ranging policy im-
plications. A brief survey of major presidential unilateral decisions by executive order
in recent decades confirms that executive unilateral action often has profound policy
consequences. President Franklin Roosevelt, for instance, established the Executive
Office of the President in 1939 via an executive order. During World War II, Roosevelt
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ordered the evacuation, relocation, and internment of Japanese-Americans. President
Lyndon Johnson, with Executive Order 11246, instituted the nation’s first affirmative
action policy. Nixon established the Environmental Protection Agency via an exec-
utive order. More recently, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, President George W. Bush created a new federal bureaucracy, the Office of
Homeland Security, to coordinate the efforts of federal agencies to combat terrorism.
While the aforementioned examples may be unique or extraordinary cases, schol-
ars do not dispute that unilateral power elevates the executive’s policymaking au-
thority, often at the expense of other institutional and political actors. Further,
while existing research sheds considerable light on the nature of presidential unilat-
eral decision-making, one important gap remains. What systematic influence does the
court exert on unilateral authority? In the following section, we present a dynamic
model of executive-judicial interactions. we begin with a discussion why dynamic
modeling is appropriate.
2.3 The Benefits of Dynamic Models
2.3.1 Learning from Population Ecology
What can modeling techniques from biological sciences tell us about modeling the
ebb and flow of presidential power? To answer this question, consider the following
S-shaped curve. Figure 2.1 depicts a typical population growth model in ecology,
which illustrates how a species’ population evolves over time.
The equation that generates this figure is:
ds
dt
= αs
(
1 − s
K
)
(2.1)
where:
• ds
dt
is the change in the size of the species’ total population over time;
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Figure 2.1: The Population Growth Model
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• α is a positive constant which represents the instantaneous rate of change;
• s is the size of the population at time t; and
• K is known as the carrying capacity, or the maximum size of the population
that available resources can, in the long run, sustain.
To better see how this equation models population growth, we can re-write
Equation 2.1 as:
ds
dt
= αs− α
K
s2 (2.2)
Equation 2.2reveals that how a species’ population changes over time is a func-
tion of just two components. The first, αs, is responsible for natural growth, i.e.,
births and deaths. The second, α
K
s2, represents all other mechanisms which cause
the population to diminish. The two components compete for dominance in Equa-
tion 2.2. Initially, when the size of the population is small relative to the total capacity
that the environment can sustain, the first term has greater influence. However, as
population size increases over time and approaches the carrying capacity, the influ-
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ence from the second term becomes more prominent. In short, this simplified model
suggests that a species’ population will grow naturally over time until it reaches the
maximum level that resources can sustain over time.
Extending this analogy to the study of the unilateral presidency, various presi-
dency scholarship note that growth in presidential power may be similarly governed.
The development over time of both the institution of the presidency and how specific
presidents learn to govern once in office appears to fit within this simplified process of
power growth. Arguably, with respect to unilateral power, the institution experienced
three transitional phases in its development: power potential, 1 transitional growth,2
and power maturity 3 (Kadera, 2001).4 Initially, the institution (and each president)
undergoes a learning phase whereby it attempts to understand and to explore both
the scope and boundary of its influence.5 Then, in the transitional stage, the institu-
tion’s ability to act experiences rapid growth as its strategies begin to mature and the
bureaucratic structure, which help presidents to carry their decisions, form.6 Last,
the institution (and each administration) reaches maturity. In this stage, both the
institution and each specific administration has fully exploited the capacity to make
decisions unilaterally; as a result, growth levels off and possibly even declines.
1Approximately the lower one-third portion of the S-curve.
2Roughly the middle one-third section of the S-curve.
3Approximately the upper one-third portion of the S-curve.
4Though scholars in international relations initially developed this typology to understand con-
flict occurrences and power transitions between nations (Organski, 1958; Tammen et al., 2000), the
underlying theoretical logic appears readily applicable to the study of the presidency. First, power
scholars in international relations recognize that policy interests are at the core of all disputes among
actors (Tammen et al., 2000). Second, as later examples would illustrate, this three-part concep-
tion of development appears to mesh well with historical anecdotes in the study of the unilateral
presidency.
5As an illustration, consider Genovese (2001) discussion of the Framers’ debate at the Con-
stitutional Convention. As Genovese (2001) notes, one explanation for why the Framers of the
Constitution were deliberately vague about the specifics of powers and duties of the executive is
their inherent trust in George Washington to define for future presidents the scopes of executive
influence. In terms of unilateral powers, Washington did exactly that, issuing directives to pro-
claim U.S. neutrality in the British-French conflict and to take actions in response to the Whiskey
Rebellion (Bailey and Rottinghaus, 2013).
6Here, think of the reliance that the Franklin Roosevelt administration placed on unilateral
directives. Credibly, no president will exceed the level of unilateral activism demonstrated by the
FDR administration.
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In addition to the argument that the presidency underwent different transi-
tional periods during its development, the importance of time cannot be overstated.
In his synthesis of the American presidency, in addition to classifying various presi-
dents into four broad political cycles—disjunction, reconstruction, articulation, and
pre-emption, Skowronek (1997) notes the importance of being in the right place, at
the right time. During periods of reconstruction leadership (where most ’great’ pres-
idents reside in Skowronek’s (1997) classification scheme), for instance, Skowronek
(1997) states that “. . . presidents who can effectively fuse power and authority in the
reproduction of political order are those who come to office beyond all semblance
of political order” (39). In other words, those who history immortalized as great
presidents are often the same people who came along at the moment where their
leadership are most desired and effective.
In short, a generalized, mathematical model of presidential power growth should
capture two essential components. First, the model must be able to account for vari-
ous developmental phases found to be important in institutional development, as well
that of individual presidents. Second, a model of presidential power should encom-
pass the over-time dynamics of the office. Later, we develop a formal, dynamic model
to capture the ebb and flow of president’s unilateral power. Specifically, we trace
the development of unilateral power through the lens of the president’s constitutional
prerogatives, as he himself defines them, and how that impacts executive-judicial
relations, and vice versa.
2.3.2 Tracing the Growth of Presidential Power: Why the Court Matters
In this section, we present an argument on why it is important to account for the
judiciary when discussing executive power, especially how it applies to the president’s
unilateral power. Specifically, we argue that, due to level of ambiguity in the Consti-
tution regarding the scope of executive power, presidents have considerable leeway in
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defining, for themselves, the nature of their policy influence. Yet, the executive does
not operate in a political vacuum. As a result, presidents must consider how other
political actors will respond to their decisions in a separated system of competing
influences (Jones, 2005). This is especially the case regarding unilateral power and
where the courts are concerned with constitutional interpretation.
What did the Framers mean when they write that “the executive power shall
be vested in [the] President. . . ” or that “[the President] shall take care that the laws
be faithfully executed,” as defined in Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution?
By some accounts, the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution
are mere designations of the office (Corwin, 1984). In other words, the Framers’
intent was only to specify, say, for the Vesting Clause, that the duties of the office
reside with the executive, and not grant an expansive definition of the powers of the
executive. Others, however, suggest a more expansive view of executive discretion
(Calabresi and Yoo, 2008),7 including the Framers themselves. As McDonald (1994)
notes, “. . . it seems evident that some of [the Framers], at least thought of execu-
tive power as contingent and discretionary: the power to act unilaterally. . . , power,
that extends beyond the ordinary rules prescribed by the Constitution and the laws
(181).” In practice, regardless of the Framers’ original intent, it is not surprising that
presidents themselves see the advantages of exploiting the ambiguity, intentionally
or not, inherent in the Constitution. As shown in the examples presented earlier,
presidents have been very adept in translating the ambiguity of the Constitution into
viable policymaking discretion. 8
7In further defense of their arguments, proponent of broad executive power also point to the dif-
fering languages in the Constitution regarding the vesting clauses of the legislative and the executive
branches, respectively. According to Article I, “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives”
(emphasis added). In contrast, the executive’s Vesting Clause does not include the phrase “herein
granted.” Many argue that the (deliberate?) omission of “herein granted” suggests that the powers
of the executive are not limited to only those explicit in the Constitution.
8Expansion of the executive’s unitary power using executive orders and signing statements ar-
guably reached an apex during the George W. Bush administration. As Waterman (2009) notes, by
the middle of 2005, the Bush administration had referenced the phrase “the unitary executive” a
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That presidents now have wide discretion in policymaking authority, especially
in regard to their unilateral power, is widely accepted in the literature. However, the
executive cannot make unilateral decisions indiscriminately and without constraints.
In cases where defining and exploring the boundaries of executive power are impor-
tant, any model of executive power growth would be remiss if it does not account for
another political actor that has a well-defined role in interpreting the meanings of the
Constitution: the court.9
In offering a model of presidential power that concentrates on the degree of
constitutional discretion the president asserts unilaterally, we follow in the footsteps
of earlier scholars such as Pious (1979) by stating that while political factors such
presidential popularity, support in Congress, and electoral mandates are important in
helping to explain the extent to which presidents will exercise unilateral authority, but
they affect presidential power only at the margins. That is, none of these mechanisms
are critical either to the uses of executive authority or how and where presidents set
limits on their own authority. As noted in both academic and popular media, all
presidents, regardless of political partisanship or their own conceptions of the role of
government in public affairs, have an intrinsic desire to leave the Oval Office stronger
than they found it (Gibbs and Duffy, 2012; Pious, 1979).10 In this regard, George W.
Bush’s words to Barack Obama during the transition period is illustrative. “We want
you to succeed. . . Whether we’re Democrats or Republican,. . . [a]ll of us who have
served in [the Oval Office] understand that the office transcends the individual.” In
total of ninety-five times across various unilateral directives.
9Typically, when one speaks of executive-judicial relations, the usual judicial actor in mind is the
U.S. Supreme Court. Now, there is a smaller set of literature which examines interactions between
the executive and courts lower in the judicial hierarchy. In this paper, we make no distinction
between the Supreme Court and the lower courts. In this paper, the “court” refers to a nameless
judicial actor which (1) engages in constitutional interpretation and (2) serves as a potential “check”
to the expansion of presidential power.
10As Gibbs and Duffy (2012) describe it, all presidents are members of “The Presidents Club,”
an exclusive fraternity composed of 43 men that have occupied the Office of the President of the
United States, each of whom is awared of trials and tribulations associated with being in the ‘hot
seat.’
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essence, the notion that the office is greater than the accomplishments and failures of
any single individual transcends across time and imbues each president with almost a
duty-like focus toward expanding the powers of the office and leaving to his successor
tools and authorities greater than he himself wielded.
By now, two themes have developed. First, the executive wants power. Expec-
tations of the person in office are now such that even an executive who can marshal all
of the resources of the office effectively may inevitably fail in the long run. A weaker
counterpart has even a greater potential for failure. Second, though expanding the
powers of the executive office may be at the forefront of a president’s many goals, his
desire and ability to do so is tempered by the court, whose ability to interpret the
scope of executive power as (ill-)defined in the Constitution is arguably greater and
more definite than that of the executive. In short, interactions between the execu-
tive and the court are inherently conflictual, as the actors compete for interpretive
supremacy. Further, interactions are dynamic and endogenous. Presidents and the
court do not act and make decisions in a vacuum. Instead, they react to each others
actions in a continuous process. The question for a researcher is how to model this
dynamic process. In the following section, we offer a dynamic model based on the ear-
lier equation to assess (1) the growth in power over time and (2) the action-reaction
dynamics of executive-judicial interactions.
2.4 The Modeling Process
How might we model the dynamic processes that are executive-judicial interactions?
Consider the following extension of S-curve relationship depicted earlier in Figure 2.1.
Bringing down Equation 2.1 from earlier, with the appropriate subscripts, and includ-
ing another equation for the second actor, the equations that produce Figure 2.2 are:
dpActorA
dt
= αp
(
1 − pActorA
K
)
(2.3)
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dpActorB
dt
= αp
(
1 − pActorB
K
)
(2.4)
where:
• p is the amount of power that each actor possesses.
Figure 2.2: The Population Growth Model - Two Competing Political Actors
Time
Po
w
er
Actor B
Actor A
Figure 2.2 illustrates how two political actors may compete for power. Initially,
both actors have relatively small amounts of power. Over time, as each’s power base
accumulates, power will increase, both in absolute terms and relative to each other.
Last, as each actors fully exploit the amount of resources available, their power level
reaches maturity and peaks. More specifically, Figure 2.2 shows that, initially, the
amount of power that Actor B possesses is lower than that of Actor A. However,
likely due to greater availability of resources, Actor B experiences higher growth rate
than does Actor A. Over time and eventually, Actor B will enjoy greater leverage and
power than Actor A. The point at which Actor B overtakes Actor A (i.e., where the
lines cross) is known as the power transition point, the zone around it is where conflict
between actors is most likely. Applying this model to executive-judicial dynamics,
we begin the modeling process iteratively.
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2.4.1 Modeling Unilateral Decisions
Presidents often invoke their unilateral authority when crafting public policies (How-
ell, 2003). If anything, considering that increasing gridlock in Congress implies that
presidents will be less successful legislatively (Binder, 1999; Edwards, Barrett, and
Peake, 1997; Howell et al., 2000), the trend toward making policy unilaterally is likely
to increase.
Our baseline model of unilateral activity starts with two simple assumptions.
First, unilateral directives offer presidents an expedient strategy to influence public
policy. Comparing the months or even years that it may take a given proposed
bill to become public law, a president can quickly shift the policy status quo with
the stroke of a pen (Mayer, 2001). Second, current levels of unilateral activity are
related to past levels of unilateralism. Presidents do not issue unilateral directives
indiscriminately. Instead, their propensity to do so is contingent upon how active they
(or their predecessors) were in the past. This is consistent with existing literature that
demonstrates the presence of serial autocorrelation in the total number of unilateral
directives issued monthly (Fine and Warber, 2012).
45
Working from these assumptions, I begin by specifying the growth in the level
of unilateral activity as a function of the past levels of presidential unilateralism. Let:
dP
dt
= α1P (2.5)
where:
• dP
dt
is the change in presidential unilateralism over time;
• P is the current level of unilateral activity (P ≥ 0); and
• α1 is a positive parameter that represents the instantaneous growth rate of
unilateral activity.
In the basic model presented in Equation 2.5, the current level of unilateral
activity, P , influences future levels of unilateralism, P ′. α1 is a positive parameter,
which serves two purposes. Across different presidential administrations, it represents
how well the current administration is able to channel the past experiences of previous
presidencies into its decision calculus for unilateral action. Within a single adminis-
tration, α1 can be treated as a learning parameter. What sorts of reactions has the
administration received in response to its previous uses of unilateral authority? If
the reactions were positive, should the administration consider bolder uses of unilat-
eral directives? Conversely, if the administration received a considerable backlash as
a result of its use of unilateral authority, to what extent should the administration
refrain from taking unilateral actions? In either case, the α1 parameter translates
current action into future decisions.
To illustrate the basic model in action, consider the uses of presidential procla-
mations to celebrate national holidays. Without failure, past presidents have all
issued an executive decree to proclaim Thanksgiving Day as a day to “. . . recount
the joys and blessings of the past year.”11 Further, as journalist Janet LaRue points
11 Obama’s 2012 Thanksgiving Day proclamation. http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2012/11/20/presidential-proclamation-thanksgiving-day-2012
46
out, “[m]any presidential proclamations are strikingly similar in their expressions of
humility, thanksgiving, dependence, confession, repentance, . . . . Every proclama-
tions concludes with the same phrase used the . . . Constitution: ‘In the year of our
Lord’.”12
The similarity in language and potentially policy orientation is not just lim-
ited to symbolic presidential proclamations. Consider also the president’s decision to
sanction foreign states. On February 27, 2001, just one month after inauguration,
President George W. Bush renewed Clinton’s sanctions against Cuba on the regula-
tion of the anchorage and movement of vessels, previously issued on March 1, 1996.13
Though it is possible that the Bush administration already has a well-defined foreign
policy agenda on Cuba just one month into the administration, the more likely expla-
nation is that Bush was simply renewing an existing executive sanction, given that
he has no pre-existing objections to it. Examples of decisions to renew sanctions de-
clared previously by earlier administrations are readily available. In short, anecdotal
evidence appears to support the assumption that past decisions will influence future
behaviors, which introduces autocorrelation into any model of presidential unilateral
action (See Ouyang and Waterman (N.d.)).
Because the president’s unilateral authority is not unlimited, I also set an upper
bound to the level of unilateralism. This limit, KP , represents the administration’s
overall desire for unilateral action in relation to potential constraints against action.
As such, it can be thought of as its carrying capacity (Edwards and Penney 1985;
Mesterton-Gibbons 1989). The carrying capacity, a concept borrowed from ecology,
is the maximum units that a given environment will support. Thus, once an admin-
12As an aside, LaRue also points out that, unlike his predecessors, Obama’s 2011
Thanksgiving Proclamation omitted any mentions of sin and forgiveness. LaRue, Janet
M. “Obama’s Thanksgiving Proclamation Strikingly Different From Predecessors.” http:
//townhall.com/columnists/janetmlarue/2011/11/23/obamas_thanksgiving_proclamation_
strikingly_different_from_predecessors/page/full
13Bush, George W. February 27, 2001. “Notice—Continuation of the National Emergency Relat-
ing to Cuba and of the Emergency Authority Relating to the Regulation and Movement of Vessels.”
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2001-03-05/pdf/WCPD-2001-03-05-Pg350.pdf
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istration reaches its carrying capacity, future actions will not yield any more changes
in unilateral activity.14 As suggested in the dynamics presented in Figure 2.2, power
cannot continue to increase in perpetuity. This is particularly the case when there
are other political actors competing for the same powers.
Expansions of executive power cannot continue unabated with opposition from
the court.15 Consider the wiretapping of certain top executives on the National
Security Council during Richard Nixon’s administration. In two cases, that of Morton
Halperin and Anthony Lake, these wiretaps continue long after these officials left
public service (Pious, 1979, 81). In June of 1973, Halperin filed suit against the Nixon
administration. Though lawyers for the administration argued that the executive has
certain prerogatives and inherent executive power to conduct such actions for national
security purposes, the U.S. Court of Appeals (DC Circuit) ultimately ruled in favor
of Halperin and condemned the Nixon administration for unlawful behavior.
While the Nixon wiretapping case certainly illustrates an instance where the
judicial actor limited the expansion of executive power, we must be careful to not
give it more credit than it deserves. In particular, the DC Court was careful even
in its decision to check the executive. In this regard, several notes are important.
First, the Court only awarded Halperin a nominal sum as compensatory damages, as
opposed to the substantial amount that Halperin requested.16 Here, Pious’s (1979)
characterization of the case is illustrative and is worth quoting at length:
14Though one can model the administration’s capacity for unilateral actions as a separate equa-
tion, I elected to not do so for two reasons. First, a focus on modeling carrying capacity will divert
attention away from the principal purpose of this study, which is to examine the extent of judicial
influences on presidential unilateral actions. The second reason is to ensure the tractability of the
models. Because dynamic models are very flexible, a researcher must not try to model the world,
but to ensure that only the critical components of the theoretical model are properly specified.
15Of course, for the court to challenge executive decisions, an aggrieved party must first appeal
to the court for judgment. However, though there are costs associated with bring a suit against the
current, or past, administration, the quality of the lawsuit matters not so much as the presence of
one. Thus, all else being equal, it should not be hard to conceive that some party or parties felt
themselves wronged by the president’s decision.
16The court awarded Halperin a nominal sum of one dollar per liable defendant, hardly a sub-
stantial amount.
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. . . the court took a middle ground. It did not wish to legitimize the
prerogative to tap without a warrant, not did it wish to grant the president
and his aides immunity from damages. On the other hand the court did
not wish to adhere to a hard and fast rule. . . . The court’s decision left it
with maximum flexibility. . . . In a different set of circumstances, a court
might yet impose massive fines, especially since the court had now put
the executive branch on notice that political use of taps would not be
tolerated. While checks and balances had been imposed, the presidency
was still free to act in legitimate espionage cases (83).
Second, and perhaps more telling, the Carter administration also joined in the
appeal against the Halperin decision, indicating that such a ruling would have a
debilitating effect on future president’s good faith efforts to take actions on national
security grounds.17 In summary, the court checked Nixon’s unlawful wiretapping of
top executive officials. More importantly, however, not only did the court retained
the flexibility to check future presidential decisions, the executive’s prerogative to
use wiretaps “legally” and “. . . the issue of prerogative power remained open” (Pious,
1979, 83).
Bringing everything together then, the model of presidential unilateralism must
also reflect a theoretical limit on the extent to which presidents can make policy unilat-
erally. Specifically, this cap on unilateral decision-making has two potential sources.
First, when the president has exhausted all the tools in the unilateral toolchest,18
further expansion of executive power via unilateral tools seems unlikely.19 A second
source of a cap on unilateral discretion results from the political environment. As
noted earlier, though political factors such as presidential approval ratings and par-
17Though Halperin filed his initial lawsuit in June of 1973, the DC Court did not decide on the
case until July 12, 1979, during the Carter administration.
18See, for instance, the discussions of the various unilateral tools that presidents have at their
disposal in Cooper (2002) and Waterman (2010).
19This does not appear to be the case yet with unilateral power.
49
tisan support in Congress do not feature prominently in this paper, prior research do
note the importance of such political environmental mechanisms as sources of con-
straints on executive action.20 To reflect this limit on growth, we modify Equation 2.5
as follows:
dP
dt
= α1P
(
1 − P
KP
)
(2.6)
where:
• KP is the administration’s overall capacity for unilateral actions, 0 ≤ P ≤ KP .
According to Equation 2.6, the pattern of growth in unilateral activity is an
S-shaped curve, similar in nature to that presented in Figure 2.1. At one extreme,
administrations with very low levels of unilateral activity are unable to change quickly,
likely due to presidential inexperience or a lack of administrative resources. However,
administrations more active unilaterally also suffer slower growth as they approach
the upper limits of unilateral potential, as room for growth is limited at the upper
extremity of the S-curve.21 Stated differently, the model of policy unilateralism in
Equation 2.6 suggests that power growth (or decline) results from two forces com-
peting with one another for influence.22 First, how active unilaterally is the current
administration with respect to past behavior? Second, where does the administra-
tion stand in relation to the total capacity of the institution for power growth via
unilateral decrees?
The final piece of the unilateral politics model is the cost associated with court
influence. Let C denote the amount of influence that the court has on how active
20For instance, see Krause and Cohen (1997) and Fine and Warber (2012).
21Others have also noted the importance of the executive’s capacity for unitary action. In fact,
as Rudalevige (2012) notes, unilateral directives sometimes have very little to do with presidential
preferences. In many cases, what are considered policy directives at the president’s order are in fact
frequently the results of what various federal agencies wanted to do in the first place. Credibly then,
capacity for action (as well as the level of activity) is related to the divergence and variation in the
policy preferences across the federal bureaucracy.
22See earlier discussion regarding population growth models and Equation 2.2.
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presidents will be unilaterally. Moreover, court constraint is relative to how active
the administration has been in its pursuit of policies by executive fiat. Stated differ-
ently, the more decisions that the president makes via unilateral directives, the more
opportunities there are for the courts to check the expansion of presidential power.
Bringing all of the parts of the model together gives us the complete equation
for unilateral action:
P ′ = α1P
(
1 − P
KP
)
− β1(C × P ) (2.7)
where:
• β1 is a positive parameter associated with the instantaneous rate of change on
the level of influence that the court has on executive decision-making.
Note that the relationship illustrated by (C×P ) in Equation 2.10 parallels eco-
logical models, in which shifts in a prey population are determined by an interaction
between the number of prey and the number of predators. The dynamics in how
the two populations change (i.e., the prey and the predator) depend on how the two
species interact. For instance, if there are more predators in the wild than there are
prey, the size of the predator population will shrink over time as there are not enough
resources (i.e., food) to sustain a large number of predators.
Translate this logic to executive-judicial interactions, this suggests that, in ad-
dition to the mechanisms of unilateral activity already discussed in Equation 2.6,
presidential unilateralism is also characterized by an action-reaction dynamic inher-
ent in executive-judicial interaction. That is, court influence does not weigh linearly
on executive decision-making. Instead, the extent to which the court matters de-
pends, in part, on the level of unilateral activity, P . To shed more light on the
theoretical mechanisms of court influence, we transition focus in the next section
toward modeling judicial influences on executive unilateralism.
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2.4.2 Modeling Judicial Constraints
As with modeling executive unilateralism, I begin the judicial equation with the
similar assumption that present and future levels of court influence on the executive
is related to past influences. Let C denote the constraints presidents face from the
court. Thus:
dC
dt
= α2C (2.8)
where:
• dC
dt
is the change in court influence over time;
• C represents the amount of influence that the court has on executive decision-
making; and
• α2 is a positive parameter representing the rate in which past values of court
influence affect present and future levels of court influence.
As is the case for presidential unilateralism, the capacity or the desire to check
the powers of the executive cannot continue without boundaries. At any given point,
the court can only marshal a finite amount of resources to counter the expanding
power of the executive branch. In other words, as with the unilateral politics model,
the court equation also contains the equivalent of a carrying capacity term in popu-
lation growth models. The court carrying capacity represents the theoretical upper
boundary of the sum total amount of influence that the court can bring to bear on
the executive.23 Accordingly, we modify Equation 2.8 to take this into account:
C ′ = α2C
(
1 − C
KC
)
(2.9)
23As noted earlier, fully exploring the determinants important in how court capacity changes
over time is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I do provide a discussion later regarding two
theoretical mechanisms shown to be important in prior research.
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where:
• KC is the total capacity of the court to challenge the executive, 0 ≤ C ≤ KC .
What might influence either the amount of influence that the court imposes
upon the executive, C, or the sum capacity of the court to act, KC? Prior studies offer
two suggestions. The first concerns a prominent theory in studies of judicial behavior:
the Attitudinal Model. Made prominent by the works of Jeff Segal and Harold Spaeth,
the core argument of the Attitudinal Model is that the preferences of individual judges
are critical important in explaining their behavior (Segal and Spaeth, 2002). This
is true with respect to both how individual judges and justices vote on a particular
case, but also where, collectively, judicial opinions derive.24 Applying insights from
the judicial behavior literature to that on presidential unilateralism, this implies that
presidents face potentially greater constraints when preferences of the executive and
the court diverge, especially from that of the median justice (Lauderdale and Clark,
2012; Moraski and Shipan, 1999).
The second component of court constraint involves the court’s general reluc-
tance to engage in political warfare with the executive. Commonly referred to as the
Political Question Doctrine, this set of studies point to the fact that courts, across
the judicial hierarchy, generally avoid involvement in political questions (Bickel, 1986;
Strum, 1974). Foremost in judges’ minds is institutional protection. As the court
possesses neither the power of the purse nor of force, the court must rely on other
political actors to uphold and to carry out its decisions. Becoming overly involved in
settling questions relating to political disputes will detract from the court’s reputation
as a neutral arbiter of the law.
24As a slight aside, note that the core principles of the Attitudinal Model does not mesh well
with common textbook accounts of executive-judicial interaction. Such accounts largely note that
the judiciary commonly defer to the executive. Where the executive and the courts mostly interact
are in the reigns of the judicial appointment process.
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Recent evidence indicates that this is indeed the case with respect to judicial-
congressional relations. Building upon personal interviews with former Supreme
Court justices and law clerks, Clark (2009) assesses the conditions under which hos-
tility in Congress toward the Supreme Court influences the Court’s use of judicial
review. Results suggest that the Court invalidates fewer congressional actions when
hostility toward the Court is higher.
That empirical evidence suggests that the Court accounts for congressional opin-
ions when issuing judicial opinion is not surprising. After all, Congress controls the
very “purse” that Alexander Hamilton referred to in Federalist Paper # 78. By the
same token, if the Court pays attention to the political actor with the power of the
purse, it must also care about the executive who controls the “force,” or the actor
in charge of carrying out the Courts’ opinion. In sum, how much the court cares
about protection its own reputation or legitimacy also affect how much opposition
presidents can expect from the court.25
Collecting Equations 2.10 and 2.11, the system of differential equations for the
model of judicial-executive interactions is:
dP
dt
= α1P
(
1 − P
KP
)
− β1(C × P ) (2.10)
dC
dt
= α2C
(
1 − C
KC
)
(2.11)
Note that both Equations 2.10 and 2.11 reflects a natural growth in power
over time, α1P
(
1 − P
KP
)
and α2C
(
1 − C
KC
)
, respectively. This is a general modeling
strategy common in both international relations and ecology to account for differing
groups competing for the same scarce resources, which in this application refer to
power held by the executive and the court, respectively. The second component
25A careful reader might note that the two mechanisms of judicial influence presented here appear
to be competing interests. Indeed they are. If the desire to maintain institutional legitimacy is high,
judicial ideological may have little influence on the level of resources that the court can imposed
upon the executive. Similarly, if divergence in policy preferences between the executive and the
court is higher relative to how much the court care about its own reputation, then the bulk of court
influence on the executive derive mostly from judicial ideology.
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in Equation 2.10, −β1(C × P ), models the action-reaction dynamics of executive-
judicial interactions. To assess how this system of equations behaves under differing
conditions, the next section presents the numerical results of this dynamic process.
2.5 Predictions
There are two strategies for solving formal models and deriving hypotheses: analytical
and numerical. Analytical techniques are usually the first step. However, the complex
nature of the equations in this work limits such an approach. Known analytical tools
are insufficient to find the equilibria for the system of equations in Equations 2.10 and
2.11. This does not mean that the models have no solutions; in fact, we are able to
see equilibria result when we perform simulations. Rather, it means that appropriate
mathematical solution procedures have not yet been devised.
In order to derive deductions from the model , we therefore use numerical simu-
lations.26 For the simulations, we generated random values for the positive parameters
using the random number generation program in R.27 We then use these random val-
ues as the parameter values for α1, α2, andβ1 in subsequent simulations of the model.
28
The numerical routine uses the system of equations specified in Equations 2.10 and
2.11 to generate all subsequent values of dP
dt
and dC
dt
. We plot the resulting values
over time, giving us the trajectories of dP
dt
and dC
dt
as the two equations interact in
the dynamic system. The differences in outcomes observed from these simulations
allow for predictions to be made regarding the behavior of both the executive and the
26In this regard, this is where dynamic modeling approaches depart from traditional empirical
studies in political science. In a standard empirically-oriented paper, one would proposes hypotheses,
which derives from theoretical accounts of the phenomenon of interest. Next, the researcher would
test whether the data gathered provide support for the hypotheses. Dynamic model approaches begin
with the translation of theoretical accounts into mathematical formulas. Following, the researcher
would solve the system of equations which represents the interests at hand (typically using numerical
simulations) to derive deductions from how the system behaves under a variety of conditions.
27These initial simulated values are: P ≈ 0.755, C ≈ 0.133, α1 ≈ 0.660, α2 ≈ 0.302, andβ1 ≈
0.697.
28In addition to simulations presented later where we alter the initial conditions, we also con-
ducted simulations by varying the parameters values. Results are in Appendix B.
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court. Below, we discuss the patterns that emerged from a total of 65 simulations.29
2.5.1 When the President Acts Alone
Though recent works in the unilateral presidency literature suggest that presidents
often use executive directives to quickly influence public policy, it remains unclear
why the court has any effect on the nature of presidential unilateralism. In this
section, simulations suggest that while the executive’s natural tendency is to rely
on unilateral action, the court impacts the extent to which the president engages
in policy unilateralism. Further, no matter how strong the president leans toward
unilateral action, influence from the court is ever-present in deterring “too much”
executive power.
2.5.1.1 Varying Levels of Unilateral Activity
Our first deduction from the simulations is that the president’s natural inclination is
to use unilateral directives to influence public policy. This is consistent with existing
literature on the unilateral presidency (Howell, 2003, 2005; Mayer, 2001; Waterman,
2009; Fine and Warber, 2012).
Figure 2.3 presents simulations of the model at four different initial values of
P (P = 0.2, P = 0.4, P = 0.6, andP = 0.8). The solid line represents the change
in policy unilateralism over time. The dashed line denotes how influences from the
court changes over time. In each of the four scenarios, with the exception of the level
of unilateral activity, all initial values and parameters are held constant. All else
being equal, the question is how shifts in the level of presidential activity change the
dynamics of executive-judicial relations.30
29There is no agreed upon standard for the minimum number of simulations required to test a
model. As Kadera and Morey (2008) note, past published work present anywhere from a low of 15
to a high of 50 simulations. Moreover, unless the initial conditions are somehow biased, there is no
grounds for assuming that more simulations would result in different conclusions.
30As the behavior of how court influence changes over time does not change in all of the sim-
ulations where values of P and KP are changed, respectively, the following discussion will focus
primarily on the executive power equation (solid line).
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Figure 2.3: Simulations for Initial Conditions where C ≈ 0.133, KC = 1, andKP = 1
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Note: This figure presents the results of the simulations of the system as rep-
resented by Equations 2.10 and 2.11. Parameters values are: α1 ≈ 0.660, α2 ≈
0.302, and β1 ≈ 0.697.
First, note that court’s influence (i.e., dashed line) increases over time in a
manner not dissimilar to the examples presented in Figure 2.2. Second, the essen-
tial dynamics of the system, at least in this set of simulations, suggest that as court
influence becomes greater, unilateral activity decreases. This is consistent with exist-
ing works on the unilateral presidency which indicate that presidents are less likely
to take unilateral action when other political actors impose greater constraints on
the executive (Fine and Warber, 2012). Third, in all four cases (most noticeable
in Simulations #1-3), the executive exhibits an initial tendency to increase policy
unilateralism. Eventually, however, the level of executive unilateralism reaches essen-
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tially a tipping point, where it then begins to decline. Last, note that the amount of
court influence eventually overtakes the level of unilateral activity. As noted briefly
earlier, power and conflict scholars in international relations call this the power tran-
sition point (Kadera, 2001; Organski, 1958).31 Conflict between the executive and
the court is most likely around this zone (Tammen et al., 2000).
In short, Simulations #1-4 illustrate the dynamics of executive-judicial relations
at four different initial levels of policy unilateralism. Presidents will gravitates toward
using unilateral directives where possible. However, as court influence in the system
becomes more prominent, policy unilateralism will decrease over time. Thus,
Deduction 1: Presidents will prefer unilateral actions when the court imposes fewer
constraints on the executive.
2.5.1.2 Varying Total Capacity for Unilateral Actions
If the executive’s natural inclination is to rely on unilateral directives to make expedi-
ent shifts to the policy status quo (Howell, 2003), what happens when the president’s
total capacity for unilateral action changes?32 In particular, do changes in the capac-
ity for policy alter the president’s decision calculus for unilateral policy? Figure 2.4
presents the results of the simulations, varying the executive’s total capacity for uni-
lateralism, KP .
Figure 2.4 presents the simulations at four possible initial states of KP (KP =
0.2, KP = 0.4, KP = 0.6, andKP = 0.8) .
33 Again, the solid line represents the level
of unilateral activity, as it changes over time, dP
dt
, and the dashed line indicates dC
dt
,
31It is called the power transition point as it denotes time at which the balance of power in the
system is transitioning from one actor to the other. Conflict is more likely because now one actor is
at least as influential as the other, and can therefore compete openly for dominance in the political
environment.
32Using empirical data on Supreme Court ideology and executive orders, we test the three de-
ductions laid out in this section. Results are largely consist with predictions from the simulations
presented here. Results available upon requests.
33As with previous graph, all initial conditions and parameters values are held constant, with the
except of the president’s capacity for unilateral action, KP .
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Figure 2.4: Simulations for Initial Conditions where P ≈ 0.755, C ≈ 0.133, andKC =
1
0 10 20 30 40
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
Simulation #5: KP = 0.20
Time
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2 dP/dt
dC/dt
0 10 20 30 40
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
Simulation #6: KP = 0.40
Time
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2 dP/dt
dC/dt
0 10 20 30 40
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
Simulation #7: KP = 0.60
Time
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2 dP/dt
dC/dt
0 10 20 30 40
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
Simulation #8: KP = 0.80
Time
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2 dP/dt
dC/dt
Note: This figure presents the results of the simulations of the system as rep-
resented by Equations 2.10 and 2.11. Parameters values are: α1 ≈ 0.660, α2 ≈
0.302, and β1 ≈ 0.697.
or how court influence changes over time.
Two points worthy of note here. First, in Simulations #5-7 (KP = .2andKP =
.4), the initial level of unilateral activity is actually above the president’s total ability
for policy unilateralism. While the total carrying capacity for unilateral activity
represents an upper boundary on the extent of executive discretion, it does not mean
that presidents cannot temporarily exceed this boundary.34 In any case, Simulations
#5-7 do illustrate the executive’s strong emphasis toward unilateral action. Even in
34See, for instance, the Nixon administration’s justification of “executive prerogative” and the
use of wiretaps for political motives.
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cases where the level of policy unilateralism exceeds the president’s capacity to do so,
the movement, while decreasing, is not immediate but gradual. In other words, even
when the president exceeds his “constitutional basis” for unilateral activity, behavior
and the shift to rely less on unilateral directives changes only gradually over time.
Second, note the markedly different rates of decline in Simulations #5-6, com-
pared to Simulations #7-8. In the first two cases (Simulations #5-6), the executive
has greatly exceeded the office’s capacity for unilateral action (roughly 0.555 and
0.35535, respectively). The further that the executive pushes beyond the capabilities
of the office, the sharper the rate of decline in unilateral activity.
In conjunction, simulations by varying the executive office’s total capacity for
policy unilateralism suggest that the amount of interpretative discretion that the
executive possesses definitely matters. Greater discretion implies more policy wiggle
room for the executive. Yet, decreased ability to move policy unilaterally does not
mean that presidents are unable to do so. Thus:
Deduction 2: The executive still leans toward unilateral actions even when the office
has decreased capacity to do so.
2.5.2 When the Court Constrains
The previous set of simulations indicate that the court is indeed influential in the
president’s decision-making calculus concerning unilateral activity. In this section,
we transition the focus to the court specifically. In particular, I ask how does the
total capacity of the court changes judicial-executive relations regarding unilateral
action.36
35Calculated by P −KP .
36As with the policy uniliateralism equation in the previous sections, we also conducted a series
of simulations on how varying the levels of court influence impacts the dynamics of the overall
system. As results are similar to those already presented in the previous section, with the exception
being that, when the court has greater initial influence than the initial level of unilateral activity,
executive-judicial conflict is not likely as the two lines do not cross at any point. Thus, in this section,
I focus on the total capacity of the court to check the executive. For results of the simulations on
how the system changes at varying levels of C, see Appendix A.
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2.5.2.1 Varying Total Capacity To Check the Executive
The final prediction from the model deals with the influence of the court on executive
unilateralism as the court’s capacity to check executive power varies. Figure 2.5
presents the simulations at four different starting values for the court’s total capacity
of influence on executive power (KC = 0.2, KC = 0.4, KC = 0.6, andKC = 0.8). As
with previous simulations, all other initial values and positive parameters are held
constant (C = .15, P = .55, KP = 1, α1 ≈ .660, α2 ≈ .302, and β1 ≈ .697).
Figure 2.5: Simulations for Initial Conditions where P ≈ 0.755, C ≈ 0.133, andKP =
1
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Note: This figure presents the results of the simulations of the system as rep-
resented by Equations 2.10 and 2.11. Parameters values are: α1 ≈ 0.660, α2 ≈
0.302, and β1 ≈ 0.697.
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Notice now how the shifts in court influence change over time, in comparison
to all other simulations presented previously. The dynamics of executive-judicial
relations change as the court’s total capacity to check the executive, KC , increases.
Note first that when the court’s ability to check the executive is low relative to
the level of unilateral activity—i.e., Simulation #13 (KC = .2) and Simulation #14
(KC = .4), opportunity for conflict is minimal. In neither one of the scenarios depicted
in Simulations #13-14 does the court possesses sufficient capability to challenge the
executive. However, note how the dynamics of the system alter as court’s capacity
increases.
Notice that when the court is considerably weaker than the executive (Simula-
tion #13), presidents have little incentive to refrain from decisions by unilateral fiat.
Compare now Simulation #13 with Simulation #14, note that even a relatively small
uptick in court capability results in changes in executive behavior. Though the court
still inadequate resources to check the executive, presidents nonetheless respond ac-
cordingly, as if almost in anticipation of a future, more powerful court. Further, as
the court’s total capacity further increases (i.e., Simulations #15-16), the shifts in
the patterns of policy unilateralism over time become more dramatic.
Combined, the simulation presented here indicates that executive-judicial inter-
actions with respect to the president’s unilateral discretion is not only characterized
by the level of unilateral activity, but also by whether the court has the capacity
to challenge the executive. Increased capacity suggests greater chances of executive-
judicial conflicts. Thus:
Deduction 3: Scenarios under which the court has greater capacity to check the
executive result in greater changes in executive behavior and unilateral activism.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a mathematical model of the relationship between execu-
tive unilateralism and court influence. Influences from works in unilateral presidency,
judicial behavior, international relations, and ecology impact the specification of the
dynamics of executive-judicial relations.
Using numerical simulation techniques, we derive three hypotheses. First, pres-
idents will prefer unilateral action when the court imposes fewer constraints on the
executive. Second, decreased capacity for unilateral action does not entirely undo
either the ability or the desire for policy unilateralism. Last, shifts in executive be-
havior and unilateralism activism are the strongest under those scenarios where the
court has greater capacity to the expansion of unilateral authorities.
The model of executive-judicial relations serves as a foundation for understand-
ing the dynamics of the interaction between the executive and the court. Still, there
is room for improvement. Though simulation results shed light on how both the
executive and the court respond dynamically to one another over time, the current
construction of the models is simple. For instance, instead of using hypothetical
values of the carrying capacity of the executive, KP , and the court, KC , we could
model those effects directly. Similarly, my model does not account for the potential
influence of the legislature on executive-judicial interactions. we leave these nuanced
representations of reality for future work.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Varying C
How do differing levels of court influence alters executive and judicial behaviors? In
this section, we present results of the simulations, varying the amount of constraints
that presidents face on the court.
Figure 2.6: Simulations for Initial Conditions where P ≈ 0.755, KC = 1, andKP = 1
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Note: This figure presents the results of the simulations of the system as rep-
resented by Equations 2.10 and 2.11. Parameters values are: α1 ≈ 0.660, α2 ≈
0.302, and β1 ≈ 0.697.
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2.7.2 Varying α1
How does behavior in the system change if we alter the rate of change in policy
unilateralism?
Figure 2.7: Simulations for Initial Conditions where P ≈ 0.755, C ≈ 0.133, KC =
1, andKP = 1
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Note: This figure presents the results of the simulations of the system as rep-
resented by Equations 2.10 and 2.11. Parameters values are: α1 ≈ 0.660, α2 ≈
0.302, and β1 ≈ 0.697.
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2.7.3 Varying α2
How does behavior in the system change if we alter the rate of change in court
influence?
Figure 2.8: Simulations for Initial Conditions where P ≈ 0.755, C ≈ 0.133, KC =
1, andKP = 1
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Note: This figure presents the results of the simulations of the system as rep-
resented by Equations 2.10 and 2.11. Parameters values are: α1 ≈ 0.660, α2 ≈
0.302, and β1 ≈ 0.697.
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2.7.4 Varying β1
How does behavior in the system change if we alter the rate of change in executive-
judicial interactions?
Figure 2.9: Simulations for Initial Conditions where P ≈ 0.755, C ≈ 0.133, KC =
1, andKP = 1
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Note: This figure presents the results of the simulations of the system as rep-
resented by Equations 2.10 and 2.11. Parameters values are: α1 ≈ 0.660, α2 ≈
0.302, and β1 ≈ 0.697.
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Chapter 3 Unilateral Executive Power Over Time: A Machine Learning
Approach
Abstract
To what extent do presidents use the many tools in the unilateral tool-
chest? How have the uses of unilateral directives changed over time? Are
there distinctions in terms of how the different unilateral tools are used?
Scholars of presidential unilateral actions have examined with renewed
interest the extent to which presidents issue unilateral directives to make
public policy. Though insightful, existing works may be problematic given
that they usually only examine a single type of unilateral action at a time,
such as executive orders. Borrowing from machine learning strategies, we
apply a novel text analytical method to examine a comprehensive dataset
of unilateral actions. We also analyze executive directives using decision
trees. These represent the first empirical analyses of all publicly-available
executive unilateral directives. Specifically, we examine: (1) the extent to
which the issue areas in which unilateral directives are used has changed
over time and (2) what distinguishes one form of unilateral directive from
another. We find that not only has the use of unilateral action in general
increased over time, presidents have also considerably expanded the range
of issue areas where they apply unilateral power. In addition, we find that
while the performance of the economy best predicts the type of directives
that presidents will issue, directives of different stripes share as many (if
not more) commonalities with each other than they do differences. Results
have implications for both the unilateral presidency and broader works in
executive decision-making.
3.1 Introduction
In December of 2012, the nation watched in horror as the deadliest mass shooting at a
school occurred at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut.1 In the aftermath
of one of the worst tragedies to happen at a school in the nation’s history, the shooting
renewed debates on gun control in the United States, including Obama’s 23 executive
1“Sandy Hook shooting: What happened?” CNN News. Link to Webpage.
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actions directed, respectively, toward federal law enforcement,2 the Department of
Justice,3 and the Department of Health.4 Initially, media incorrectly reported that
Obama had signed 23 executive orders designed to address gun violence and gun
control.5 While parts of the media later corrected their reporting to reflect the three
presidential memoranda that Obama issued,6 the confusion surrounding exactly what
the president had done reflects broader questions in both the popular media and in
academics. To what extent do presidents use the many tools in the unilateral tool-
chest? How have the uses of unilateral directives changed over time? Are there
distinctions in terms of how the different unilateral tools are used?
Scholars of presidential unilateral actions have examined with renewed interest
the extent to which presidents issued unilateral directives to make public policy. For
instance, Howell (2003) finds that presidents issue more executive orders when (1)
policy disagreement with chambers of Congress increases and (2) when Congress
may be poised to enact policies to which the executive disagrees. Though insightful,
existing work may be problematic given that it usually only examine a single type of
unilateral action at a time, such as executive orders.
Understanding how and where presidents utilize unilateral power is important
for two reasons. First, one important component of presidential power is the scope
of the executive’s ability to make policies unilaterally. Thus, a better understand-
ing of how presidents utilize executive power is critical to understanding the role of
2Obama, Barack. January 16, 2013. “Memorandum on Improving Availability
of Relevant Executive Branch Records to the National Instant Criminal Background
Check System.” Link to Webpage.
3Obama, Barack. January 16, 2013. “Memorandum on Tracing of Firearms in
Connection with Criminal Investigations.” Link to Webpage.
4Obama, Barack. January 16, 2013. “Memorandum on Engaging in Public Health
Research on the Causes and Prevention of Gun Violence.” Link to Webpage.
5Werner, Erica, and Julie Pace. “Obama Signs 23 Gun Safety Executive Orders
Vows Tough New Laws.” NBC Bay Area. Link to Webpage.
Ungar, Rick. “Here Are The 23 Executive Orders On Gun Safety Signed Today By
The President.” Forbes. Link to Webpage.
6Amira, Dan. “President Obama Didn’t Sign Any Executive Orders Today.” New
York Magazine. Link to Webpage.
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the executive in the political system. Second, decision-making by executive fiat has
become more controversial recently. In the public domain, executive orders appear
synonymous with unilateral action. This is not necessarily the case, however. As
Dodds (2013) notes, there are upward of 27 different unilateral policy tools that the
executive has at his disposal. Comprehending how unilateral executive decisions are
related in broader context will promote further public discussions of the nature of
executive power in general and the decision-making by executive fiat in particular.
Borrowing from machine learning strategies, we apply a novel text analytical
method to examine a comprehensive dataset of unilateral actions. We also analyze
executive directives using decision trees. These represent the first empirical analyses
of all publicly-available executive unilateral directives. Specifically, we examine: (1)
the extent to which the issue areas in which unilateral directives are used has changed
over time and (2) what distinguishes one form of unilateral directive from another.
We find that not only has the use of unilateral actions in general increased over time,
presidents have also considerably expanded the range of issue areas where they apply
unilateral power. In addition, we find that while the performance of the economy
best predicts the type of directives that presidents issue, directives of different stripes
share as many (if not more) commonalities with each other as they do differences.
We begin by providing an overview of the works in the unilateral presidency and
conclude by noting why existing works fail to capture the potential strategies with
which presidents employ unilateral power. We then analyze the most comprehensive
compendium of unilateral directives data to date using approaches from machine
learning. The analyses proceed in two parts. First, using topic models, we examine
how implementation of unilateral power has changed over time, particularly with
respect to the issue areas where presidents employ unilateral action. Second, we
examine how the different types of unilateral directives are related to one another.
We conclude with the discussion of the results and implications for broader works in
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the unilateral presidency and executive decision-making.
3.2 Unilateral Politics: An Overview
The scope of executive power has expanded dramatically since the Founding. Decades
ago, Neustadt (1990) spoke of the president’s inability to command policy changes
and famously reminded us that “presidential power is the power to persuade.” The
problem with this formulation of executive power is that more recent developments
in American Politics—e.g., greater ideological division in Congress (Krehbiel, 1998)
and higher likelihood of divided government (Cameron, 2000)—suggest that even
the potential for presidents to lead and to enact public policies are now threatened.
Facing greater legislative challenges in Congress, recent administrations now turn to
unilateral action as a core component of their policymaking strategy.
The use of unilateral power is not new. By unilateral, we refer to:
. . . the president’s formal capacity for taking unilateral action, and thus
for making law on his own. Often presidents do this through executive
orders. . . . But whatever the vehicles they may choose, the end results
is that presidents can and do make new law—and thus shift the existing
status quo- the explicit consent of Congress (Moe and Howell, 1999, 133).
A quick perusal of major executive actions in U.S. history will likely reveal major
instances of decision-making by executive fiat. They include: (1) George Washing-
ton’s Proclamation of Neutrality; (2) Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclama-
tion; (3) Harry Truman’s executive order to desegregate the military; and (4) George
W. Bush’s executive order establishing the Office of Homeland Security in the after-
math of 9/11. In sum, presidents have already made use of unilateral power. Yet, it
is not until unilateral action became a dominant strategy in executive policymaking
that they draw significant attention from scholars.
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One of the seminal works in this area, Howell’s (2003) game-theoretical exami-
nation of executive orders spurred a line of studies which examine the determinants
of executive orders usage. Marshall and Pacelle (2005), for instance, assess execu-
tive orders in relation to the two presidencies thesis. Among other results, they find
that while the share of the president’s party in Congress significantly affects domestic
policy executive orders, no such effect exists for those orders that deal with foreign
policy matters. Even more recently, Warber’s (2014) work challenges the perception
that the sole purpose of executive orders is to provide bureaucrats with public policy
implementation instructions. In particular, Warber (2014) shows how presidents may
be using executive orders for public outreach purposes, to target specific populations
with policy.
Works in the unilateral presidency literature have also examined other forms
of unilateral directives. These range from studies that focus on executive agree-
ments (Prins and Marshall, 2009), presidential proclamations (Belco and Rottinghaus,
2009; Rottinghaus and Lim, 2009; Rottinghaus and Maier, 2007), signing statements
(Crouch, Rozell, and Sollenberger, 2013; Cooper, 2005; Kelley and Marshall, 2009,
2010), and memoranda (Lowande, 2014).
Though insightful and yielding considerable insights on regarding the nature
of unilateral executive decisions for each individual type of directive, by focusing on
only one type of executive directive at a time, existing works are unable to parse
out how different types of directives are related and how presidents may utilize them
as strategic policy tools. For example, Cooper (2002) points out the difference be-
tween an executive order and a memorandum is in name only, calling presidential
memoranda as executive orders by another name. Similarly, Lowande’s (2014) re-
cent article also speaks to this possibility. In particular, Lowande (2014) notes that
given that the recent controversy associated with executive orders, presidents may be
substituting presidential memoranda for executive orders. If presidents view and use
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the various forms of executive directives differently than they are currently examined
in the literature, we must revise our conception of unilateral actions as it relates to
strategic policy decisions. We begin by topic modeling all publicly-available unilateral
directives to assess how their usage has changed over time.
3.3 Topic Modeling of Unilateral Presidential Directives Using RText-
Tools
In what topic areas do presidents issue directives? How has the use of unilateral di-
rectives changed over time? In this section, we attempt to offer the first systematic,
empirical topic coding of unilateral presidential directives from the George Washing-
ton administration to the end of Barack Obama’s first term in office. To date, while
there have been attempts to code individual sets of unilateral directives, such as the
Policy Agenda Project’s coding of executive orders, they fall short of (1) coding of
other forms of unilateral directives and (2) assessing the relationships among different
types of directives. One of the more comprehensive attempts to date, Dodds (2013)
qualitatively assesses the breadth and scope of unilateral decision-making with respect
to the issues on which presidents make unilateral decisions. While Dodd’s (2013) work
represents the best attempt thus far to examine different types of executive directives
in a singular work, it remains useful to examine executive unilateral directives quanti-
tatively to better assess over time trends. In sum, by offering quantitative assessment
of all publicly available unilateral directives from Washington to Obama, not only are
we able to detect any noticeable trends in unilateral decision-making over time, but
to offer scholars a more complete dataset of unilateral decision-making in general.
3.3.1 Data
Data on executive directives were collected in waves. First, we began by gathering all
publicized executive orders, proclamations, and memoranda from the White House’s
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website and the Federal Register. Data available of these sources vary across admin-
istrations. For instance, online data from the White House is limited to Obama’s
directives, while the online version of the Federal Register contains only published
directives dating back to 1993. We supplemented the unilateral directives dataset
with those from the American Presidency Project. To ensure the completeness of our
executive orders data, we merged our data with those by Warber (2006). In total, our
dataset contains 15,307 individual unilateral directives and consists of: (1) signing
statements; (2) memoranda; (3) proclamations; (4) presidential notices; (5) executive
orders; (6) presidential determinations; and (7) statements of administration policy.
In sum, our dataset comprises one of the most comprehensive compendiums of all
publicly available unilateral executive directives issued from Washington to Obama.7
Figure 3.1 summarizes the distribution of the unilateral directives dataset by
president. Not surprisingly, the majority of the data are from FDR onward. In
particular, based on Figure 3.1, we see three distinct groups of trend. First, and prior
to the FDR administration, record-keeping of executive decisions is questionable at
best. Thus, while our dataset does contain unilateral decisions from Washington to
Hoover, we remain skeptical regarding the totality of decisions in the early period.
Second, we see a period from the FDR administration to George H.W. Bush where
unilateral activity is high. Last, the administrations of Clinton, Bush II, and Obama
stand out in contrast to earlier administrations. While we cannot speak to the exact
reason for the dramatic increase in unilateral decisions beginning with the Clinton
administration, it is without question that Clinton, Bush II, and Obama are more
active unilaterally than their predecessors and that the usage of unilateral directives
7As various scholars have noted, some executive directives remain unknown to the public.
Though the Federal Register Act (1935) requires presidents to publicize executive orders and procla-
mations. Various directives - executive orders, in particular only became public knowledge years
after they were issued. Some remain “hidden” to this day. Further, presidents are not required to
publish memoranda in the Federal Register. For these reason, while we were able to record examples
of unilateral executive decision-making as far back as the Washington administration, we cannot be
certain of the completeness of the data prior to 1935. Nonetheless, our dataset still represent the
comprehensive analyzed to date.
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for policymaking has increased over time.
Figure 3.1: Percentages of Unilateral Directives - by President
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This figure presents the distribution of the unilateral directives dataset by presi-
dent.
Figure 3.2 illustrates trends in three of the most numerous unilateral directives
in our dataset: presidential executive orders, proclamations, and memoranda from
1935 to 2014.8 9 As the graph depicts, there are systematic differences in how each
type of directives were employed over time. For executive proclamations, there is
a gradual, almost linear, increase in the number of proclamations issued from 1937
onward. This gradually increasing pattern is similar for memoranda, albeit much
less dramatic than proclamations. In contrast, the trend in executive order usage,
8For presentation reasons, we elected to only present three of the 7 types of unilateral presidential
directives in the dataset. Primarily, Figure 3.2 serves to illustrate that a singular focus on any one
of the many types of unilateral decisions potentially mask the true nature of how presidents employ
unilateral power.
9We selected 1935 as the start date for the figure because we cannot be certain of the validity
of the data prior to this date.
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Figure 3.2: Trends in Monthly Executive Orders, Memoranda, and Proclamations
Issued (1935 - 2014)
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This figure illustrates the trends in monthly presidential executive orders, memo-
randa, and proclamations issued from 1935 - 2014.
after reaching its peak during the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, declines
geometrically over time.
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In sum, Figure 3.2 shows that patterns in how presidents utilize executive orders,
proclamations, and memoranda have changed over time. Most importantly, while it
may be attractive to aggregate these directives and analyze them as the total number
of unilateral actions over this period, Figure 3.2 indicates that such approaches will
miss the nuanced nature of each individual type of unilateral directives. Now that
we have briefly described our data and the trends in executive orders, memoranda,
and proclamations, we proceed to topic coding, a discussion of the topic modeling
procedures, and the software utilized.
3.3.2 The RTextTools Procedure
In this section, we provide an overview of RTextTools and its machine learning al-
gorithms and procedures. Within the social sciences, scholars have employed con-
tent analytic strategies to yield valuable insights across various disciplines. Political
scientists have used content analysis to extract important information concerning,
for instance, the style and tone of Al-Qaeda leaders (Pennebaker and Chung, 2009)
and policy positions (Laver, Benoit, and Garry, 2003; McGuire and Vanberg, 2005;
Proksch and Slapin, 2009). However, manually coding hundreds, if not thousands,
of text documents is prohibitively expensive, in terms of both time and resources
required (Farganis and Wedeking, 2011).
Recently, scholars have developed a series of techniques to overcome the is-
sue of hand-coding documents. To date, scholars have made considerable advances
in both dictionary-based content analysis methods (Hart, 2001; Hart and Childers,
2004; Pennebaker and Chung, 2009; Slatcher et al., 2007) and supervised and unsu-
pervised approaches (Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkerson, 2008; Hopkins and King, 2010;
Quinn et al., 2010). With regard to text classification, supervised and unsupervised
approaches allow researchers to classify various textual data into categories and/or
proportions of the categories, at minimal costs. The challenge with existing methods,
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however, is that they require from researchers substantial knowledge of statistics and
computer programming.
To overcome these challenges, we use RTextTools, a new software that allows the
use of supervised machine learning algorithms for classification without requiring re-
searchers to have technical expertise in computer science and computer programming
(Jurka et al., 2012). “...RTextTools is designed as a one-stop-shop for conducting
supervised learning with textual data” (Jurka et al., N.d., 1). In short, RTextTools
provides easy access to supervised machine learning for a novice user, while main-
taining the capability for an advanced user to conduct more refined analyses.
Before discussing the specific procedures for using the software, we begin with a
quick explanation of the format of the initial dataset and computing power required to
conduct analysis using RTextTools. First and foremost, RTextTools accepts data from
an Access, CSV, or Excel file, where at a minimum the initial data file matrix must be
of sizeN×3 (N rows and 3 columns). Each row corresponds to a single text document;
thus, one column within the initial dataset should contain the name of document of
interest. Another column in the initial dataset should contain-at least for the portion
of the total text documents used as the “training set” - the category classification
to which each document belongs. Human coders manually code the text documents
used as the “training set.” The last of the three minimum columns should contain
the text used for the analysis. This can be the title of the documents of interest,
segments of individual documents, or entire documents themselves. Turning now to
the computing power required to run RTextTools, paraphrasing Jurka et al. (N.d.),
users with a minimum of 4GB of memory on their computers can run RTextTools on
medium to large-sized dataset (i.e., approximately 30,000 texts). For users with larger
datasets, RTextTools is compatible with cloud computing services, such as Amazon
EC2.
RTextTools implements the supervised machine learning procedure in a ten-
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step process. However, if users are only interested in using RTextTools for text
classification, and not in performance evaluations, one can skip steps seven through
nine and go directly to the last step, exporting the results to a CSV file. To begin using
RTextTools for text classification, one starts with the installation of the RTextTools
package in the open-source software R. As with other R packages, RTextTools is
available via the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN) package repository. To
install RTextTools, one uses the install.packages() command from within R 2
.13+, as with any other CRAN packages.
Once RTextTools is installed in R, the user can then import data. Further,
using the tm package, the user then generates a document-term matrix. At this point,
several pre-processing options are available, including removing whitespace, removing
sparse terms, removing stopwords, and stemming. Moreover, these procedures extend
beyond the English language to languages such as Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French,
German, Norwegian, Portuguese, Russian Spanish, and Swedish.
After the user pre-processes the texts and generates a document-term matrix,
the matrix is then partitioned into a corpus, to include telling RTextTools the size and
location of both the training set and the test set. For instance, if there were a total
of 1,200 text documents in the initial dataset, and the training set is composed of the
first 500 documents—i.e., the researcher had manually coded the first 500 documents
with respect to the category that each document belongs—one would input into
RTextTools the knowledge that documents 1 through 500 is the training set, and that
documents 501 through 1,200 is the test set. Lastly, the user must tell RTextTools
whether the test set is a “virgin” set. A virgin set means that the researcher has
no prior knowledge of the documents within the test set-i.e., the researcher has not
already classified into categories the documents within the test set. The purpose of
the RTextTools, then, is to use the information contained within the training set to
classify the “unknown” documents in the test set.
79
Now that the user has partitioned the matrix into a corpus, the fourth step
would be to train the computer algorithms provided—Support Vector Machine (SVM);
Supervised Latent Dirichlet Allocation (SLDA); BOOSTING; Bootstrap Aggregat-
ing (BAGGING); Random Forest (RF); Net-regularized Generalized Linear Models
(GLMNET); Neural Network (NNET); Decision Tree (TREE); and Maximum En-
tropy (MAXENT)—on the corpus. Following the training step where the nine com-
puter algorithms learn using the training set, the fifth step is to classify the documents
in the test set. RTextTools will return the results of the classified data in a matrix,
where the columns are the results based on each algorithm.
As with any content analysis methods where computer algorithms play signifi-
cant roles in the analyses (Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkerson, 2008; Hopkins and King,
2010; Quinn et al., 2010), it is useful to interpret the results as well as to ascertain
their validity. In Step 6, RTextTools provides a function to help users understand
their data by “. . . return[ing] a container with three different summaries: by label
(e.g., topic), by algorithm, and by document” (Jurka et al., N.d., 2). For users not
particularly concerned with RTextTools’s performance compared to human coders,
one can stop after completing Step 6.
To continue the last 4 procedures provided in RTextTools, and to assess perfor-
mance evaluation, the user must have had coded and classified those documents in
the test set. Step 7 allows users to evaluate individual algorithm accuracy using the
following formula:
RecallAccuracy =
tp
tp+ fn
, (3.1)
where the true positive tp observations are the number of documents correctly classi-
fied and the false negative fn observations are the number of cases that are incorrectly
classified.
Following the evaluation of the accuracy level for individual computer algo-
rithms, the user can also assess whether ensemble agreement enhances accuracy. En-
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semble agreement refers to whether multiple algorithms make the same prediction
regarding the category to which a text document belongs. This step can be of partic-
ular importance, given that others have found that an ensemble approach performs
better than any single algorithm (Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkerson, 2008). Further,
as 90% intercoder reliability seems to be the gold standard in the social sciences,
Collingwood and Wilkerson (2011) found that when four algorithms agree on the
label of a text document, “. . . the machine label matches the human label over 90%
of the time” (3). Given that a combination of different computer algorithms—i.e., an
ensemble approach-provides higher accuracy, users could in theory prefer one algo-
rithm over another to include in the ensemble. In that case, RTextTools provides a
command to perform cross-validation regarding the accuracy of each algorithm. This
allows users to ascertain the accuracy of each algorithm, as well as to choose, if neces-
sary, the specific algorithms to include in the ensemble. To complete this discussion
of the RTextTools procedures, the last step is to export the data. To continue further
analyses of the data, one can export the results to a CSV file.
3.3.3 Model
In this section, we describe the setup of topic modeling conducted using RTextTools.
All results shown below were conducted utilizing term frequency inverse document
frequency variant of text analysis. In Table 3.1, we provide the topic codes used in
the topic models, along with examples of directives that are in each issue area; these
codes are adopted from the Policy Agendas Project. For the training set, we take
advantage of the topic coding that already exists for executive orders, from the Policy
Agendas Project. These data represent an excellent source for the training set. First,
previously coded executive orders span the length of our dataset. Thus, we are able
to account for the extent to which the wording of directives has changed over time.
Second, presidents have used executive orders to address a myriad of issue areas. To
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Table 3.1: Topic Classiciation Categories (with Examples)
Code Topic Examples
1 Macroeconomics Memorandum on Biofuels and Rural Economic Development
2 Civil Rights, Minority Is-
sues, and Civil Liberties
Establishment a White House Council on Women and Girls
3 Health Memorandum on Medicare Demonstration to Test Medical Homes
in Federally Qualified Health Centers
4 Agriculture Statement on Signing the Farm Security and Rural Investment
Act of 2002
5 Labor, Employment, and
Immigration
Notification of Employees Rights Concerning Payment of Union
Dues or Fees
6 Education Actions to Improve Low-Performing Schools
7 Environment Memorandum on a 21st Century Strategy for America’s Great
Outdoors
8 Energy Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
9 Immigration Assignment of Functions Relating to Arrivals and Departures from
the United States
10 Transportation Memorandum on Aviation Screening Technology and Procedures
Review
11 Law, Crime, and Family
Issues
Memorandum on the White House Task Force on Middle-Class
Working Families
12 Social Welfare President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security
13 Community Development
and Housing Issues
Memorandum on Inventory of Federal Service Opportunities and
Regulatory Barriers to Community and Other Service Activities
14 Banking, Finance, and
Domestic Commerce
President’s Advisory Council on Financial Capability
15 National Defense Optimizing the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in
the United States
16 Space, Science, Technol-
ogy, and Communications
Memorandum on Scientific Integrity
17 Foreign Trade National Export Initiative
18 International Affairs and
Foreign Aid
Memorandum on Foreign Assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijian, and
Tajikistan
19 Government Operations Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking
20 Public Lands and Water
Management
Statement on Signing the Omnibus Public Land Management Act
of 2009
This table lists the topic classification scheme for unilateral actions, with examples. Sources:
Policy Agendas Project.
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the extent that it is possible to assess beforehand, executive orders are indicative of
the types of issues that presidents address via unilateral action. Last, we have done
extensive validation of this data. By all indications, the executive orders will work
well as the training data.
3.3.4 Results
Figure 3.3: Number of Algorithms Agree on Topic Code
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This figure presents the level of ensemble agreement using RTextTools. Colling-
wood and Wilkerson (2011) find that when four algorithms agree on a label, the
machine label matches human coders over 90% of the time. In addition, hav-
ing three algorithms agree represents the best compromise between coverage and
accuracy, approximately 85% for both.
In this section, we provide the results of the topic modeling using RTextTools.
We begin with algorithm agreement. Figure 3.3 presents the ensemble summary of
the nine algorithms, based on the analysis conducted in RTextTools. Overall, the
results are very positive. As Collingwood and Wilkerson (2011) note, when four
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algorithms agree on a label, the machine label matches human coders over 90% of
the time. In addition, while a 4 algorithm agreement matches the 90% intercoder
reliability coveted in the social sciences, having three algorithms agree represents the
best compromise between coverage and accuracy. Approximately 96% of all directives
in the test set have three or greater number of algorithms agreeing on the label. 70%
of directives in the test set have four or more algorithms agreement on topic code.
Now that we established that topic modeling via RTextTools has performed
sufficiently within established norms of accuracy, where and in what issue areas have
presidents utilized executive directives? Figure 4 presents the results of RTextTools
on unilateral directives.10 By far, presidents issue most directives to address concerns
in government operations (code = 19) and in national defense (code = 15). Approx-
imately one-third (36.80%) of all directives from Washington to the end of Obama’s
first term in office deal with government operations. These are largely mundane
concerns with governing a large executive branch, including, for instance, a memo-
randum on regulatory coordination amongst federal agencies,11 an executive order
on the management of federal legal resources,12 and a memorandum on assigning
reporting functions to fulfill obligations under the Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 2009.13
Closely following government operations unilateral directives is executive deci-
sions regarding national defense. 30.55% of all directives address areas dealing with
10Because directives relating to government operations, national defense, and international affairs
and foreign aid dominate Figure 3.4, we also provide a revised version of the figure in Appendix
A, excluding these directives in these three areas. This figure illustrates a more refined version of
the distributions of directives across different issue areas, while excluding the top three dominating
topic areas.
11George Bush:“Memorandum on Regulatory Coordination,” January 28, 1992.Online by Ger-
hard Peters and John T. Woolley,The American Presidency Project. Link to Webpage.
12Jimmy Carter:“Executive Order 12146 - Management of Federal Legal Resources,” July 18,
1979.Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,The American Presidency Project. Link to
Webpage.
13Barack Obama:“Memorandum on Assignment of Reporting Functions Under the Supplemen-
tal Appropriations Act, 2009,” July 17, 2009.Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,The
American Presidency Project. Link to Webpage.
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national defense. Examples include a memorandum addressing classified informa-
tion regarding the Air Force’s base near Groom Lake, Nevada14 and Executive Order
10909, which amends Executive Order 10865, dealing with the safeguard of classified
information within U.S. industries.15
Figure 3.4: Percentages of Unilateral Directives - by Issue Areas
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This figure presents the results of RTextTools on unilateral directives. See Ta-
ble 3.1 for list of topic categories. By far, presidents issue most directives to
address concerns in government operations (code = 19) and in national defense
(code = 15).
While we do not present the breakdown of unilateral directives by issue areas by
president, we provide figures depicting this information in Appendix B. Two points
are important. First, based on the results here and those in Figure 3.2, the use of
14George W. Bush:“Memorandum on Classified Information Concerning the Air Force’s Operat-
ing Location Near Groom Lake, Nevada,” September 18, 2001.Online by Gerhard Peters and John
T. Woolley,The American Presidency Project. Link to Webpage.
15Dwight D. Eisenhower:“Executive Order 10909 - Amendment of Executive Order 10865, Safe-
guarding Classified Information Within Industry,” January 17, 1961.Online by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley,The American Presidency Project. Link to Webpage.
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unilateral directives has definitely increased over time. Second, and more impor-
tantly, the scope of unilateral presidential decision-making has also increased. Many
sources now point to Theodore Roosevelt as the administration whereby unilateral
directives came into maturity as an important executive policymaking tool (Dodds,
2013). Though not able to directly confirm Dodds’s (2013) assertion, we do however
find some evidence for it. Theodore Roosevelt, though he may not have been the
most unilaterally active of his era, certain implemented policies across a whole host
of different issue areas while in office. After a brief hiatus during the Harding and
Coolidge administrations, the use of unilateral directives across multiple issue areas
persists to this day.
3.4 Stratifying Unilateral Presidential Directives Using Decision Trees:
A Nuanced Exploration
As the last section illustrates, not only has there been a marked increase in the num-
ber of unilateral directives over time, presidents now apply their unilateral decision-
making capabilities to an ever-widening range of policy areas. One question, however,
still remains. Under what conditions do presidents issue such directives? Do presi-
dents issue different types of unilateral directives under different political and environ-
mental conditions? For instance, suppose the executive wishes to direct the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) and other federal agencies to
adopt certain policies regarding gun violence and gun control. Will the executive
issue an executive order directing the ATF to do so, or, when facing a different set of
circumstances, issue a presidential memorandum? In other words, what explains the
types of unilateral directives issued?
In this section, we address these questions by analyzing all publicly-available
unilateral directives from 1973-2012 using decision trees. A decision tree is a pre-
dictive modeling tool commonly used in machine learning to explore the relationship
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between a target variable and a set of input variables, or features. It can be used
to visually and explicitly model decisions and the decision-making process. For our
purposes, we use a type of decision tree called classification trees, which are used
when the target (dependent) variable consists of only finite number of values.16 For
each directive decision, we predict the most commonly occurring type of directives in
the region to which it belongs. The unit of analysis is a directive.
Figure 3.5: Example Decision Tree
This figure depicts an example decision tree. The three important components of
a decision tree are: (1) internal codes; (2) branches; and (3) terminal codes (or
branches).
Applying decision trees to unilateral presidential directives is useful and relevant
for several reasons. First, tree-based methods are simple and easy to interpret, even
for a novice. Consider the following example. Figure 3.5 depicts a visual represen-
tation of a decision tree17 of predicting types of unilateral directives using one input
16In the case here, our target variable consists of four possible values, each representing: (1)
signing statements; (2) memoranda; (3) proclamations; and (4) executive orders.
17Visually, there are three main components: (1) terminal nodes (or leaves); (2) internal nodes
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variables, the economic misery index. To begin, the first split of the dataset occurs at
the top of the tree. In this instance, and since this is the first split, the first internal
node contains 100% of the dataset, where 29% of the total data are comprised of
executive orders, 23% are memoranda, 30% are proclamations, and 18% are signing
statements. At each node, the predictive model will predict the most likely class,
based on the distributions of the classes at that node. In the case here, since procla-
mations represent the highest proportion of all four types of unilateral directives at
this node, the model predicts proclamation as the most likely prediction. Based on
the splitting rule, the algorithm branches the data into two terminal nodes. The left
node represents all directives that were issued when the economic misery index is
greater than or equal to 13; 17% of all directives fall into this category where the
most likely category is executive order.18 In contrast, the model would predict that
presidents issue most proclamations when the misery index is less than 13.19
Second, many argue that decision trees more closely resemble human decision-
making processes than do other classification methods.20 For instance, various works
in psychiatry and medical sciences indicate that heuristics decision-making are not
only surprisingly accurate but also mimic real-world decisions (?). In an environ-
ment where the executive must make timely decisions under constant duress, heuris-
tics become important when making critical decisions under time and information
constraints. As ? note, “. . . people tend to rely on heuristics that can make better
and faster decisions than complex, information-greedy strategies” (86-87). In sum,
because decision trees make splitting decisions one input variable at a time, decision
trees are useful because they are considerably easier to interpret than other methods
(where the splits occur); and (3) branches (the segments that connect the nodes). Trees are typically
drawn upside down, in the sense that the leaves are at the bottom of the figure.
18This terminal node contains 17% of the dataset, where 47% of the data are comprised of
executive orders, 20% are memoranda, 1% are proclamations, and 32% are signing statements.
19This terminal node contains 83% of the dataset, where 25% of the data are comprised of
executive orders, 24% are memoranda, 36% are proclamations, and 15% are signing statements.
20For an extended discussion, see Section 8.1 in (Gareth et al., 2013).
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and better mimic real-world decisions.
3.4.1 Data
The explanation most commonly provided in the literature regarding why presidents
use unilateral action is that it depends on whether there is unified or divided gov-
ernment. Yet the theoretical implications of divided government are quite confusing.
One would expect that during periods of divided government presidents would have
greater incentives to act unilaterally than they would during unified government,
when the power to persuade is at its highest point. Yet Howell’s (2003) analysis
of the unilateral presidency indicates that executive action actually decreases dur-
ing periods of divided government. Many other studies report conflicting evidence
on this point. Some of this variation in findings may be explained by the measures
that are employed. Some studies employ a dummy variable to represent the presence
or absence of divided government, while others use the actual seats controlled by
the presidents or the opposition’s party in the House and/or the Senate. Theoreti-
cally speaking, the problem with each of these measures is that the effects of divided
government have changed over time.
Let’s take an historical example to demonstrate this point. From 1957 to 1959
the seat split in the House of Representatives was 234 Democrats, 199 Republicans
and 2 Independents. With Eisenhower, a Republican in the White House, this meant
that the opposition party Democrats controlled 35 more seats than the Republi-
cans. Between 2013 and 2015 the split in the House was 201 Democrats and 234
Republicans.21 With Barack Obama, a Democrat in the White House, the opposi-
tion Republicans controlled 33 more seats than the Democrats. If we use either a
dummy variable or seats controlled by the two parties, these two situations appear to
21These numbers are approximate because the number of seats can change during a Congress’
two-year session, as some members depart for various reasons and are replaced by new members,
often of another political party.
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be comparable. Yet, Eisenhower had far greater success in passing legislation than did
Obama - (Eisenhower 52.9 percent Congressional Quarterly success score; since we
do not yet have data for 2013-2015, Obama’s CQ rating for 2011-2012 is instructive:
in 2012 Obama “won only 15.5 percent of House call votes on which he expressed a
position” (Bond, Fleisher and Cohen, Forthcoming). On the other hand, during his
first two years in office Obama’s success rate as measured by Congressional Quarterly
was 96.7 in the Senate and 94.4 in the House,22 higher scores than even Eisenhower
achieved (an 89.2 percent combined CQ score) during his first two years under unified
government. So how did the political dynamic change over time?
One obvious answer is that the two parties are now far more ideologically di-
vergent than they were in the late 1950s. In the House, Eisenhower had the ability to
reach across the aisle for conservative Democratic votes, while Obama had difficulty
attracting any Republican votes at all. Likewise, during Obama’s first two years in
office strict party line voting, particularly on major issues, was prevalent. With ma-
jorities in the House and the Senate, Obama was able to pass many of his legislative
initiatives.
The political situation in the Senate has changed perhaps even more so than
in the House. While from 1957-1959 Eisenhower confronted Democratic control of
the Senate by a narrow margin (49 to 47), Obama in 2013-2015 had a Democratic
majority (53 to 45, with 2 Independents, both generally siding with the Democrats).
Yet, despite the apparent seat advantage, it was actually more difficult for Obama
to secure the Senate’s approval because of the increased threat of a filibuster by the
political opposition. During Eisenhower’s presidency cloture votes occurred just 0.2
percent of the time. Under Obama cloture-related votes occurred 33.5 percent of
the time (Bond, Fleisher and Cohen, Forthcoming). Eisenhower could still negotiate
with conservative Democrats to pass legislation he preferred, while Obama’s ability to
22http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2010/01/13-obama-congress-binder
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negotiate was negligible. As this example demonstrates, divided government may be
a poor proxy measure for a presidential interaction with Congress because it cannot
account for changes in the nation’s political dynamics over time.
While we acknowledge the various problems associated with the measure, di-
vided government remains an important variable in our models. Yet, the fact that
different studies suggest that the divided government has both a negative and a posi-
tive impact on the presidential propensity to issue unilateral action suggests that it is
important to uncover a more exacting influence of divided government on executive
unilateralism. We do so by including two separate measures of divided government in
the models: (1) a binary variable coded 1 if the presidency and the House is controlled
by different political parties and (2) a binary variable coded 1 if the presidency and
the Senate is controlled by different political parties. Our intent is to capture the dif-
fering influences in which the House and the Senate, respectively, impacts unilateral
executive decision-making.
In addition to divided government, we also examine the potential influences
of various president-specific explanations. Presidential ideology is another alterna-
tive explanation for variations in unilateral action over time. Presidents with more
ideological views may find it more difficult to negotiate and compromise with mem-
bers of Congress. Hence, presidents who have more extreme ideological views (either
left or right) should find it more difficult to pass legislation and should have greater
incentives to act unilaterally. Thus, we include two separate measures to capture
presidential ideology: (1) the Common Space ideology score and (2) a binary variable
coded 1 if the executive is a member of the Democratic Party.
We also include other president-specific characteristics found to be important
in studies of unilateral actions. They include: (1) presidential approval ratings; (2)
economic misery index; (3) a binary variable to denote a president’s second term in
office; (4) a binary variable coded 1 if it is the president’s first year in office; and (5) a
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binary variable to capture a president’s first six months in office. Ideally, presidential
approval ratings and the economic misery index will represent environmental oppor-
tunities to make policies unilaterally. The binary variables denoting the president’s
second term, first year in office, and first six months in office, respectively, will cap-
ture any unilateral directives intended to reverse the policies of his predecessors, as
well as any new administration policies.
3.4.2 Model
In the following section, we fit a decision tree for the unilateral presidential direc-
tives data. The primary variable of interest (or the dependent variable) is type of
unilateral directives. The input variables are: (1) divided government (House); (2)
divided government (Senate); (3) first six months in office; (4) second term in office;
(5) democratic president; (6) presidential ideology; (7) presidential approval; (8) eco-
nomic misery index; (9) ideological difference between the executive and the median
member in the House; and (11) ideological difference between the executive and the
median member of the Senate. We begin by fitting an initial tree. We then validate
the results of the initial model using the complexity parameter and the cross valida-
tion error. Last, we fit the final pruned model based on the results of the validation
process to create an optimal decision tree. All analyses are conducted using R and
the rpart package.
3.4.3 Results
Figure 3.6 shows the results of pruned decision tree in graphical form. Counting
both internal nodes where the splits occur and the terminal nodes (i.e., the end of a
branch, or leaf), there are a total of 259, 415 nodes! While an in-depth discussion of
every node and leaf in the decision tree is beyond the scope of this project, we are,
however, able to infer several general statements about unilateral decision-making,
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based on the structure of the tree and the relationships among the input variables.
Figure 3.6: Full Decision Tree - Unilateral Presidential Directives
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Rattle 2015−Feb−26 11:45:16 yuouy_000This figure presents the graphical version of the pruned decision tree.
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First, of the 11 input variables, the most important is the economic misery
index. A function of both the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, the misery
index refers to economic and social costs of the nation. Higher values of the misery
index translate into greater deterioration of the nation’s economy. As many of the
internal nodes near the top of the tree illustrate, the primary variable for many of
the early splits of the data is the economy misery index. Thus, based on the initial
split of the data, the bulk of unilateral directives issued from 1973 - 2012 occurred
when the economy is performing poorly.
Figure 3.7: Variable Importance Plot
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This figure illustrates the relative importance of the input variable in the pruned
model. The most importance input variable is the economic misery index, followed
by ideological difference between the executive and the median member in Sen-
ate (Common Space), presidential ideological (Common Space), and presidential
approval (Gallup). Variable importance scores sum to 100.
To put the relative importance of the economic misery index on the executive’s
unilateral decision-making in greater perspective, Figure 3.7 illustrates the relative
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importance of each input variable on the final pruned model. The variable importance
score reflects each variable’s contribution in classifying the target variable as either
the primary or as the surrogate splitter variable. Variable importance is the sum of
the goodness of split measures for each split for which it was the primary variable,
plus the goodness of split times the adjusted agreement value for all splits in which
the variable was a surrogate. Variable importance for all variables sums to 100.
As Figure 3.7 shows, the most important variable in the construction of the
decision tree and the predicting of the types of unilateral directives is the economic
misery index, with an importance score of 31. The second most important variable
is the ideological division between the president and the median member in the U.S.
Senate (Variable Importance Score = 14), followed closely by Common Space presi-
dential ideology score (Variable Importance Score = 14), approval ratings (Variable
Importance Score = 14), and the ideological difference between the executive and the
median member in the House of Representatives (Variable Importance Score = 11).
While the two divided government and the various time in administration measures
are important, they are relatively weak compared to the rest of the input variables.
Lastly, while the above results tell us much about the nature of unilateral exec-
utive decision-making and the relative importance of many variables, we would like
to provide an additional layer of caution about predicting the type of unilateral di-
rectives that the executive will issue. Prediction is hard! Though model validation
indicates that the decision tree model fits the data well, there remains a substantial
level of “misclassification.” While the model is able to accurately predict the type of
directives in many cases, it fails dramatically in others. To illustrate this dilemma
visually, consider Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8 presents a scatterplot of the directive’s score on the first two compo-
nents from a Principal Components Analysis, along with a 50% and a 95% confidence
ellipses. We conducted a Principal Components Analysis of the 11 input variables on
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the type of unilateral directives, and then predicted the each observation’s location
on the first two components.23 The ellipses represent 50% and 95% of observations,
respectively. The black squares and oval lines represent all executive orders. The
green triangles and oval lines indicate presidential proclamations. The red circles
and oval lines denote presidential memoranda. And the blue points and oval lines
represent signing statements. The center of the ovals is marked by a plus sign, of the
corresponding color.
Several results stand out. First, we are glad to see that there is considerable
overlap between executive orders and presidential memoranda. This is consistent
with recent literature suggesting that memoranda may be replacing executive orders
as unilateral tools as public awareness of executive orders has increased (Lowande,
2014). Elsewhere, Cooper (2002) also refers to presidential memoranda as executive
orders by a different name. In sum, we find that both executive orders and presidential
memoranda are issued under largely similar environmental conditions, suggesting the
potential for presidents to issue a memorandum when they want the public to pay
less attention to their potentially controversial decisions.
Second, the centers of each of the four ovals are near each other, indicating that
the bulk of unilateral directives were issued under similar environmental conditions.
This is especially the case for signing statements and executive orders.
We are somewhat surprised by the degree of overlap between executive orders
and signing statements. Executive orders are proactive forms of unilateral directives,
i.e., the president can issue executive orders directly, without consulting with, for
instance, Congress. In contrast, signing statements are more reactive. They occur
only when the executive wishes to respond formally to components of legislation he
signed into law. One potential explanation for this phenomenon is that both executive
orders and signing statements occur somewhat at random. That is, presidents cannot
23Eigenvalues indicate that there are two principal components in the model.
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Figure 3.8: Principal Components Analysis - with Confidence Ellipses
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This figure presents a scatterplot of the directive’s score on the first two com-
ponents from a Principal Components Analysis, along with a 50% and a 95%
confidence ellipse overlays. The black squares and oval lines represent all execu-
tive orders. The green triangles and oval lines indicate presidential proclamations.
The red circles and oval lines denote presidential memoranda. And the blue points
and oval lines represent signing statements. The center of the ovals is marked by
a plus sign, of the corresponding color.
control the exact timing in which they must make unilateral decisions via executive
orders. Similarly, presidents do not have full control of what and when legislation
appears on their desk for signature into law.
Last, we note that shape, size, and direction of presidential proclamations differ
substantially from that of other unilateral directives. This suggests that, of the four
types of unilateral decisions we consider, proclamations are the most different, with
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the caveat that the differences are of degrees and not necessarily by kind. This is con-
sistent with the knowledge that proclamations now largely deal with ceremonial issues
across a myriad of different topic areas. In sum, prediction of the exact form that
the executive’s unilateral decision will take is difficult. Nonetheless, given the extent
of the overlap between the different directives, we are still able to extract valuable
information regarding what may distinguish one form of directive from another.
3.5 Conclusion
Scholars have analyzed unilateral executive decisions in considerable detail. While
insightful, we claim that existing works may be problematic given the singular focus
of only examining a single type of unilateral action at a time. Understanding how
different directives are related to one another allows us to better assess how presidents
employ unilateral power and to promote greater public discussion regarding the nature
of executive power in general and decision-making by executive fiat in particular.
Borrowing from machine learning strategies, we apply recently developed tech-
nique in text analysis and decision trees to examine the most comprehensive single
compendium of unilateral action to date. The use of unilateral action in general has
increased over time, both in terms of sheer volume and across issue areas. Broadly
speaking, based on the available data at hand, we detect three distinct groups of pres-
idents. From the administration of George Washington to that of Herbert Hoover,
given the incomplete nature of the data, we are skeptical to make any strong con-
clusions regarding how unilateral power is utilized. Second, we see a period from the
FDR administration to George H.W. Bush where unilateral activity is high. Last, the
administrations of Clinton, Bush II, and Obama stand out significantly in contrast
to earlier administrations. In addition, we find out that while the performance of
the economy best predicts the type of directives that presidents will issue, directives,
of different stripes, share as much (if not more) commonalities with each other than
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they do differences. In particular, the best predictor of the type of directives that
presidents will issue is the economic misery index, an indicator of national economic
performance.
As with most studies, our current work raises as many, if not more, questions
as it answers. We are particularly interested in those cases where the predictive
decision tree model “misclassifies.” What makes this subset of, say, executive orders,
distinct from other executive orders? We suspect that one potential explanation
for this phenomenon is the domestic vs. foreign policy divide. Elsewhere, Marshall
and Pacelle (2005) find that determinants impacting president’s ability to influence
policy-making in Congress differ considerably between domestic vs. foreign executive
orders. Generalizing from their results, it is conceivable that there are fundamental
differences in presidential decision-making calculus when the executive contemplates
domestic vs. foreign unilateral directives.
Another potential suggestion is the major vs. minor unilateral directives dis-
tinction. Not all unilateral decisions are created equally. As Howell (2003) notes,
“. . . distinguish[ing] significant from insignificant orders. . . is of crucial importance, for
the vast majority of executive orders, like laws, concern rather mundane affairs. . . ”
(78-79). It is entirely plausible that adding this extra layer of complexity to the anal-
yses presented here will yield additional insights regarding how and when presidents
set policy.
While examining these distinctions between domestic vs. foreign and major vs.
minor unilateral directives are beyond the scope of this project, we hope to pursue
these questions in the near future. As it currently stands, our project advances the
unilateral presidency literature in two important ways. First, we note that it is
important to consider both how uses of unilateral power have changed and the areas
where presidents employ unilateral decisions. Second, and more importantly, we
show that there are important differences and similarities across types of unilateral
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directives. Future research on this topic should consider the nature of unilateral
presidential directives and how the different types of directives can affect presidential
behavior.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Percentage of Directives across Issue Areas - Excluding Govern-
ment Operations, National Defense, & International Affairs and
Foreign Aid
Figure 3.9: Percentage of Directives across Issue Areas - Excluding Government Op-
erations, National Defense, & International Affairs and Foreign Aid
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Percentages of Unilateral Directives - by Issue Areas
This figure presents the results of RTextTools on unilateral directives, excluding
all directives relating to government operations (code = 19), national defense
(code = 15), and international affairs and foreign aid (code = 18). See Table 3.1
for list of topic categories.
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3.6.2 Unilateral Directives over Time - By President
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